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ARTICLES
SULLIVAN v. ZEBLEY NEW DISABILITY STANDARDS FOR
INDIGENT CHILDREN TO OBTAIN GOVERNMENT BENEFITS
RICHARD P. WEISHAUPT*
ROBERT E. RAINS**
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 20, 1990, the United States Supreme Court issued
its opinion in Sullivan v. Zebley,1 striking down the rules and regula-
tions that have been applied by the Social Security Administration
(SSA) of the United States Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (DHHS) to deny benefits to disabled indigent children under the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.' The Court held that
the "regulations and rulings implementing the child disability statute
simply do not carry out the statutory requirement that SSI benefits
shall be provided to children with 'any ... impairment of comparable
severity' to an impairment that would make an adult 'unable to engage
in any substantial gainful activity.' "
The Zebley decision is of enormous practical importance for many
* Project Head for Health and Human Services, Community Legal Services,
Philadelphia, Pa. J.D. 1974, Harvard Law School. Counsel of Record for Respondents.
Mr. Weishaupt argued the case before the Supreme Court and was lead counsel along
with his colleague Jonathan M. Stein. The author wishes to thank Mr. Stein and his
co-counsel Mark Kaufman, Sheldon Taubman, and Thomas Sutton for their unflagging
efforts, support, and assistance.
** Professor of Law and Director, Disability Law Clinic, The Dickinson School
of Law, Carlisle, Pa. J.D. 1974, Harvard Law School. Counsel of Record, Brief of The
National Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives As Amicus Cu-
riae In Support Of The Respondents.
c Copyright 1990, Robert E. Rains and Richard P. Weishaupt
1. 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990).
2. Id. at 897. SSI is a federal cash assistance program established in 1972 by
Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1988).
3. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. at 897 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(4)).
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thousands of disabled children. SSI is the only federal program specifi-
cally designed to provide monetary assistance to poor families that have
the additional personal and medical expenses associated with raising a
severely disabled child. A recent study funded by the Bureau of Mater-
nal and Child Health and Resources Development, DHHS,4 (and dis-
puted by SSA) 5 concluded that SSA's rigid criteria improperly re-
stricted access to SSI benefits for children with multiple impairments,
younger children whose disabling impairments are not yet well diag-
nosed, functionally impaired children, and children with incomplete
medical records,6 among others.
The Court's opinion will require SSA to readjudicate the claims of
hundreds of thousands children previously rejected for SSI.7 Of these, a
significant number will certainly be granted benefits retroactively. Fu-
ture claims for children's SSI will have to be adjudicated under more
flexible standards that allow for a realistic individual assessment of a
child's functional impairments. In addition, the Court's statements con-
cerning SSA's statutory obligation to perform individualized determi-
nations have significant implications for the administration of related
programs administered by SSA, especially pending benefit claims of
disabled widows.'
This Article will describe the legal and programmatic background
of the Zebley litigation, explain the litigation history of the case, and
explicate the Court's decision. It will then describe initial efforts to im-
plement the decision for disabled children, and explore the implications
of the decision for pending disabled widows litigation.
II. THE FEDERAL DISABILITY PROGRAMS
The federal government provides cash benefits for qualifying dis-
abled persons through two major interrelated programs: Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) under Title II of the Social Security Act'
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the So-
4. H. Fox & A. Greaney, Disabled Children's Access to Supplemental Income
and Medical Benefits (Dec. 1988).
5. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 15 n.10, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885
(1990) (No. 88-1377).
6. H. Fox & A. Greaney, supra note 4, at 66.
7. SSA estimates 452,552 children are eligible for readjudication. SOCIAL SE-
CURITY ADMINISTRATION, STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARY OF NOTICE MAILINGS (Apr. 30,
1991).
8. The separate disability test for widows has been eliminated effective January
1991, by Section 5103 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). As will be discussed infra, the disabled widows pro-
gram includes disabled widowers and certain disabled surviving divorced spouses. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1577 (1990). For the sake of convenience, we refer to the program as
the "disabled widows" program throughout this article.
9. Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1988).
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cial Security Act." Both programs are administered at the federal level
by the Social Security Administration under rules, regulations, and
procedures promulgated by the Secretary of the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services1" ("the Secretary"). 2 Each major
program has subcategories of persons who may be eligible for disability
benefits.
A. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Benefits Under Title
H of the Social Security Act
As its name implies, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI),
under Title II of the Social Security Act, is a quasi-insurance program.
Benefits are awarded on the basis of disability to three groups of indi-
viduals: disabled workers, disabled adult children, and disabled widows
or widowers. One criterion for eligibility for each subcategory is that
the claim be made on the Social Security account of a worker who had
been, or still is, paying into the Social Security Trust Fund.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1399 (1988). There are other federal disability programs
that target specific populations - such as federal workers' compensation, veterans' dis-
ability pensions, and the black-lung program - which are beyond the scope of this
article.
11. These programs were formerly administered by the United States Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) - the predecessor to DHHS.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(a), 1383(d)(1) (1988) (delegating authority to the Secre-
tary to provide for the nature and extent of proof and evidence of disability). Despite
the fairly broad rulemaking power found in 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) and §1383(d)(1), the
grant of authority is less sweeping than others that commit even more to the Secre-
tary's discretion. For example, the provision establishing the disabled widow's program,
explicitly defined disability in terms of "a level of severity which under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary is deemed to be sufficient to preclude . . . any gainful
activity." This grant of power was certainly more broad than that found in the major
Social Security disability programs. For a discussion of the disabled widows program,
see infra Section VII. Nevertheless, in both Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987)
and Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983), the Supreme Court equated the grants
of rulemaking power in 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(a) and 1383(d)(1) with the standardless and
discretionary provisions in Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34 (1981), and Bat-
terton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977). In Batterton, the Secretary's construction of
the term "unemployment" in the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC)
program was at issue (the statute gave the Secretary unqualified power to set standards
for what constituted unemployment). 432 U.S. at 425. In Gray Panthers, the issue was
whether the Secretary had the power to set standards for the "deeming" of income in
the Medicaid program. 453 U.S. at 43. In both cases, the statute was totally silent as
to the limits on the Secretary's discretion. Despite this obvious difference, the Court
has consistently conflated the delegations of rulemaking power in Gray Panthers and
Batterton with the more limited delegation in Titles II and XVI. Given the Court's
failure even to comment in Yuckert on the distinction between these delegations, de-
spite extensive briefing, the respondents in Zebley conceded the point.
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1. Disabled Workers
The largest subcategory of SSDI recipients is disabled workers.
The claimant must be insured for disability, file an application 3 and be
disabled." Disability-insured status, for most workers, requires that
they have paid into the Social Security Trust Fund in twenty out of the
forty calendar quarters prior to the onset of their disability."5 In other
words, they (and their employer) must have paid Social Security taxes
for at least five years out of the ten years before onset of the disability.
Such a worker has twenty "QCs" (quarters of coverage) and meets the
twenty/forty rule.
An insured worker who meets these criteria becomes entitled to
Social Security benefits after a five-month waiting period that begins
with the onset of disability.' 6 In addition, the beneficiary becomes enti-
tled to hospital insurance benefits under Part A of the Medicare pro-
gram after an additional twenty-four months (that is, twenty-nine
months after onset).' The disabled worker may also elect to pay pre-
miums to obtain supplemental medical insurance under Part B of the
Medicare program. 18
In addition, payments may be available to the disabled worker's
family. A spouse can receive benefits on the disabled worker's account
if the spouse and the insured are the natural parents of a child who is
in the spouse's care, and the child is under the age of sixteen or is
disabled. 9 The disabled worker's children are likewise entitled to bene-
fits if they are dependent on the worker, they apply, they are unmar-
13. See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (upholding the denial of So-
cial Security benefits when a potential claimant did not file a written application be-
cause a Social Security field representative erroneously advised her that she was not
eligible). This harsh result has been partially abrogated by section 10,302 of the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2482
(1989) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1383(e)(5)).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1988); 20 C.F.R. § 404.315 (1990).
15. Different rules exist for those who become disabled before age 31, for those
who had a period of disability before age 31, and for those who are statutorily blind.
See 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1) (1988); 20 C.F.R. § 404.130 (1990).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2) (1988). 20 C.F.R. § 404.315(d) (1990) provides:
This 5-month waiting period begins with a month in which you were both
insured for disability and disabled. Your waiting period can begin no earlier
than the 17th month before the month you apply - no matter how long you
were disabled before then. No waiting period is required if you were previ-
ously entitled to disability benefits or to a "period of disability" under §
404.320 anytime within 5 years of the month you again became disabled.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395j.
19. 20 C.F.R. § 404.330(a)(2), (c) (1990). Also, a spouse age 62 or older is
eligible without being required to have a child in his or her care. 20 C.F.R. §
404.330(c).
[Vol. 35:539
SULLIVAN v. ZEBLEY
ried, and they are under the age of eighteen." The amount of benefits
payable to the disabled worker, spouse, and children is dependent upon
the worker's "primary insurance amount" (PIA) and is limited by a
"family maximum."21
2. Disabled Adult Children
There is an important exception to the termination of benefits
when the child of a disabled worker reaches age eighteen. If the child
has a disability that began before the child reached age twenty-two, he
or she can continue to receive Social Security benefits indefinitely on
the disabled worker's account.22 Such an individual is known as a "dis-
abled adult child." A disabled adult child loses Social Security upon
marriage unless the marriage is to another Social Security
beneficiary. 3
3. Disabled Widows, Widowers, and Surviving Divorced Spouses
The disabled widows program includes disabled widowers and cer-
tain disabled surviving divorced spouses.2 The general rule is that, in
order to receive benefits, the surviving divorced spouse must have been
married to the insured worker for at least ten years immediately before
the divorce became final.2 5 A widow, widower, or surviving divorced
spouse who becomes disabled within seven years of the death of the
insured is entitled to receive Social Security on the deceased's ac-
count.26 This "disabled widow" need never have worked in covered em-
ployment, nor paid Social Security taxes.
B. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Under Title XVI of the So-
cial Security Act
Recognizing that many disabled persons do not fit into one of the
Title II categories set forth above, in 1972 Congress enacted the Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI) program, as Title XVI of the Social
Security Act.2" As SSI pertains to disabled persons, there are two sub-
20. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350 (1990). The separate rules for disabled adult children
are discussed infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
21. For the complex rules setting forth how to determine the primary insurance
amount (PIA) and family maximum, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.201-.290 (1990).
22. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(e). Full-time elementary and high school students can
also continue to receive benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.350(e), 404.367-.369 (1990).
23. 20 C.F.R. § 404.352(b)(2) (1990).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), (f); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1577 (1990).
25. 20 C.F.R. § 404.336(a)(2) (1990).
26. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.335(c)(1) and 404.336(c)(1) (1990). There are numerous
conditions and provisos not germane here. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.330-.338 (1990).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(c) (1988). The SSI program replaced the old fed-
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categories of beneficiaries: disabled adults and disabled children.
1. Disabled Adults
SSI is a need-based program, as opposed to an insurance-type pro-
gram. A disabled adult who is "eligible on the basis of his income and
resources" is entitled to benefits." The income and resources limita-
tions are quite severe. 9 There is no requirement that the adult ever
have worked or paid into the Social Security Trust Fund. The claimant
may have worked sporadically, but fail to meet the twenty/forty rule
for SSDI disability-insured status. In some cases, a claimant may have
disability-insured status, but has a low PIA, resulting in SSDI benefits
that are actually lower than the SSI benefits. In such a case, the pre-
vailing claimant would receive disability insurance benefits, plus SSI,
reduced by the amount of the SSDI benefits. 0
Many adults benefit from the SSI disability program. They are
often persons with mental retardation, or chronic mental illness, whose
minimal earnings would not qualify them for disability-insured status
under Title II. At this writing, the current maximum SSI monthly pay-
ment for an individual is $407, assuming no deduction for actual or
deemed income."1 In addition, receipt of SSI normally makes an indi-
eral-state programs of the Social Security Act - Titles I (Old Age Assistance), X
(Aid to the Blind), and XVI (Aid to the Totally and Permanently Disabled).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1381a.
29. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1100 - .1266 (1990) (setting forth complicated income
and resources rules).
30. The claimant's SSDI benefits would be classified as "unearned income." 20
C.F.R. § 416.1121(a) (1990).
Frequently a claimant for disability benefits has applied for, and is receiving, ben-
efits through a state and/or county funded General Assistance, General Relief, or
Home Relief program. Such state or county funded assistance is considered "Interim
Assistance." Ordinarily, the state will require the claimant to apply for SSI, even if the
claimant would be eligible for SSDI disability insurance benefits in excess of the SSI
maximum. See e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432.21 (Purdon Supp. 1990). In addition,
some states require the claimant to assign the potential back award of SSI to the state
as a condition for receiving interim assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g) (1988). The state
cannot require an assignment of the back award of SSDI benefits, however, because the
Act prohibits such an assignment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 407, 1383(d), (g). The Secretary
therefore will not recognize an assignment of Social Security benefits. Philpott v. Essex
County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973) (barring state welfare agency from enforc-
ing an assignment of back award of federal disability benefits).
When SSA grants a concurrent claim, it first computes the back award of SSI and
remits that to the state welfare department when there has been an assignment. Then,
SSA reduces the back award of SSDI benefits by the amount of the back award of SSI
and remits the net amount to the claimant. Thereafter, if the monthly SSDI benefit is
greater than the SSI maximum, the disabled person will receive only the SSDI, and no
monthly SSI. See Mazza v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 903
F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1990).
31. There are detailed rules governing deductions for actual or "deemed" in-
[Vol. 35:539
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vidual eligible for medical assistance ("Medicaid") under Title XIX of
the Social Security Act.32 For the indigent disabled person, availability
of Medicaid may well be even more important than the SSI cash
benefit.
2. Disabled Children
As part of the SSI program, Congress specifically included indi-
gent disabled children as beneficiaries.3 As with SSI for adults, child
recipients are also ordinarily entitled to receive Medicaid.3
Including children in the SSI program was a marked departure
from previous social welfare policy. Generally, the SSI program was
seen as a replacement of the former adult category 5 programs, which
were conceived as programs for those who were no longer expected to
participate in the work force 6 - those who were too old, too infirm, or
blind - in short, the worthy poor. Needy children were to be provided
for by Title IV of the Act, the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) program." However, as the SSI bill made its way
through Congress, the provision for disabled children was added.3" Vir-
tually no floor debate or legislative history records congressional think-
ing on this addition, other than the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee's observation:
It is your committee's belief that disabled children who live in low-
income households are certainly among the most disadvantaged of
all Americans and that they are deserving of special assistance in
come. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1100 - .1182 (1990). States may provide a supplement to
the federal payment and approximately half of them do so, ranging from a low of $4.00
to a high of $240.00. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PUB. No. 17-002, THE SUP-
PLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM FOR THE AGED, BLIND, AND DISABLED
(1985). State supplements are mandatory in some cases and optional in others. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.2001 (1990).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (1988).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1988).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i).
35. See supra note 27.
36. Many commentators have.discussed the connections between welfare policy
and the work force. See, e.g., Sparer, Welfare Reform: Which Way Is Forward?, 35
NLADA BRIEFCASE 110 (1977-78); see also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 544
(1972) (noting Congress' desire to encourage welfare recipients to become self-
sustaining).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1988).
38. What was to become the SSI bill also originally included Richard Nixon's
controversial Family Assistance Program (FAP) which would have replaced the AFDC
program with a small, federally financed, guaranteed income. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4989, 5015
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. The AFDC provisions of FAP sparked most of the de-
bate. The floor debates only fleetingly mentioned the inclusion of children in the SSI
program. See 117 CONG. REC. 21,329 (1971).
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order to help them become self-supporting members of our society.
Making it possible for disabled children to get benefits under this
program, if it is to their advantage, rather than under the programs
for families with children, would be appropriate because their needs
are often greater than those of nondisabled children. The bill, ac-
cordingly, would include disabled children under the new program.
Parents' income and resources would be taken into account in deter-
mining the eligibility and benefits of children under age 21.89
The House added the provision for disabled children when it
amended the Senate's version of the bill. 40 The Social Security Admin-
istration would later argue that this virtual silence, coupled with the
lack of a social welfare tradition regarding income maintenance for dis-
abled children, made development of an appropriate standard a difficult
task.
Eligibility for children's SSI is dependent upon both poverty and
disability. There is no real counterpart in the SSDI programs. Children
of middle and upper income families, no matter how disabled, are not
eligible for monetary benefits.
Unfortunately, the "rigidity" of the Secretary's approach to the
children's SSI program left Congress' promise of aid unfulfilled for
many impoverished, disabled children.4 1 Zebley successfully challenged
the Secretary's mechanical denial of SSI benefits for children who do
not fit neatly into certain disability categories. 2
III. THE DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITY
"The Social Security Act is among the most intricate ever drafted
by Congress. Its Byzantine construction, as Judge Friendly has ob-
served, makes the Act 'almost unintelligible to the uninitiated.' 41
A. Statutory Definitions
The highly technical statutory definitions of "disability" are at the
heart of the Zebley litigation. The Social Security Act has provided
several definitions of the term: one for workers and adult SSI claimants
in general, one for widows, and one for children.' The basic definition
39. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 38, at 5133.
40. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1605, 92d Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5370, 5398-99.
41. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. at 894 n.17.
42. Id. at 897.
43. Schweiker v. Grey Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) (quoting Friedman v.
Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 US. 984 (1977)).
44. Additionally, for blind persons age 55 and over, disability is separately de-
fined as the "inability by reason of such blindness to engage in substantial gainful
activity requiring skills or abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity in which
he has previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time."
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generally applicable to workers reads as follows:
(1) The term "disability" means -
(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months;
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A) -
(A) An individual ... shall be determined to be under a disabil-
ity only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the na-
tional economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the imme-
diate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists
for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For
purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual),
"work which exists in the national economy" means work which ex-
ists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual
lives or in several regions of the country."5
In 1972, when the SSI program was enacted, Congress defined
"disability" under SSI in the same manner that it defined "disability"
under SSDI.4 The obvious problem for child applicants is that a defini-
tion based on the inability to perform previous work or engage in other
substantial gainful activity is not directly relevant. The younger the
child, the less relevant is an employment standard. Six-year-olds are
not in the job market. Accordingly, Congress did not directly apply the
SSI adult disability standard to children. Congress instead indirectly
applied the adult standard of disability to children, by providing:
"[Q1r, in the case of a child under the age of 18, if he suffers from any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment of comparable
severity.' 147 The central question in Zebley was whether the Secretary's
rules and practices of determining child disability conformed to this
statutory criterion of "comparable severity."8
Congress provided another definition of disability for those seeking
benefits under the disabled widow(er)s program:
A widow, surviving divorced wife, widower, or surviving di-
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(B) (1988). The separate widows' standard of disability was pro-
spectively eliminated by Section 5103 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1988).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3) (1988).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1988).
48. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. at 890.
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vorced husband shall not be determined to be under a disability...
unless his or her physical or mental impairment or impairments are
of a level of severity which under regulations prescribed by the Sec-
retary is deemed to be sufficient to preclude an individual from en-
gaging in any gainful activity."9
For both SSDI and SSI programs, Congress has mandated that
the Secretary consider the combined effect of all of an applicant's
impairments:
In determining whether an individual's physical or mental im-
pairment or impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that
such impairment or impairments could be the basis of eligibility
under this section, the Secretary shall consider the combined effect
of all of the individual's impairments without regard to whether any
such impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity.
If the Secretary does find a medically severe combination of impair-
ments, the combined impact of the impairments shall be considered
throughout the disability determination process.50
B. The Regulatory Framework
The Social Security Act grants the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) broad rulemak-
ing power to implement the SSDI and SSI disability programs.5' Thus
empowered, the Secretary has promulgated extremely detailed substan-
tive and procedural regulations, plus numerous less formally issued di-
rectives and rulings.
Currently, the Secretary's sequential evaluation process, formally
adopted in 1978, is the key to determining disability.52 This is a five-
step process which has been applicable to adult claimants for SSDI and
SSI, but not fully applicable to children or disabled widows.53 If a
claimant is found disabled, or not disabled, at any stage of the sequen-
tial evaluation, the evaluation process terminates." The steps are as
49. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B), superseded as of January 1, 1991; see supra note
8.
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C), 1382c(a)(3)(F).
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(a), 1383(d)(1); see Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. at 466;
Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 145 (confirming that Congress conferred exceptionally
broad authority on the Secretary to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of
the Social Security Act).
52. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-.1599 (1990).
53. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. at 899.
54. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a) (1990). There is a four tier adminis-
trative procedure for determining disability. The initial application is adjudicated by
the claimant's state agency, which is under contract to the Social Security Administra-
tion. A claimant who is rejected at this level may seek "reconsideration," which is also
performed by the state agency. A still dissatisfied claimant may then appeal the deter-
[Vol. 35:539
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follows:
Step One - Substantial gainful activity. The first question is
whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity"
(SGA). 55 If so, there is no disability, and the evaluation ends. If not,
the adjudicator continues the evaluation to step two. "Substantial gain-
ful activity" is a term of art, described in detail in the regulations."
Step Two - Severe impairment. If the claimant is found not to be
engaged in substantial gainful activity, the next question is whether the
claimant suffers from a "severe" impairment(s). To be considered "se-
vere," the impairment must "significantly" limit "the physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities. ' 57 The Secretary's interpreta-
tion of severity has been, and continues to be, the subject of much con-
troversy." If the claimant is found not to have a severe impairment,
there is a ruling of not disabled.59 If there is a finding of severity, the
adjudicator proceeds to step three.
Step Three - The Listing of Impairments. At this stage, the ad-
judicator must determine whether the claimant has a condition con-
tained in SSA's Listing of Impairments, or is equal to a listed impair-
mination before an administrative law judge (ALJ) employed by DHHS. If the ALJ
rejects the claim in whole or in part, the claimant may appeal to the Secretary's Ap-
peals Council, the final stage of administrative review. In addition, the Appeals Council
may review a favorable ALJ decision on its "own motion." See Rains, A Specialized
Court For Social Security? A Critique of Recent Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1,
4-5 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900-.982, 416.1400-.1494 (1990).
55. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a) (1990).
56. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571-.1576, 416.971-.976 (1990). The Secretary recently
raised from $300 to $500 the amount of monthly income that will ordinarily lead to a
conclusion that a claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 54 Fed. Reg.
53,600 (1989) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574, 416.974 (1990)). This was the first
increase in the presumptive SGA level in a decade. Id.
57. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).
58. In Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 151, the majority upheld the Secretary's
"severity" regulations against a facial challenge. In a concurring opinion, however, Jus-
tice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, opined that the Secretary may not use the
second step of the evaluation as a mechanism to deny benefits to claimants who meet
the statutory definition of disability. Id. at 156. Evidence presented by respondents
suggested that, at various periods, the Secretary had used the "severity" step to inap-
propriately deny benefits to many claimants. Id. at 155. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's
opinion largely turned on a new standard of severity that had been adopted shortly
before the argument. Id. at 155 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)). Both the majority
and the three dissenting Justices (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall) questioned the
past application of the "severity" regulations. Inevitably, there has been further litiga-
tion on the subject. See, e.g., Bailey v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 52 (3rd Cir. 1989) (invalidat-
ing the Secretary's policy of refusing to consider the combined effect of non-severe
impairments when determining disability); Brown v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 311 (8th Cir.
1987) (remanding after Bowen v. Yuckert in which the court's earlier determination
held step two to be an invalid exercise of the Secretary's authority).
59. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (1990).
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ment.60 The listings are a compendium of 125 adult and 57 children's
impairments. SSA's changing, and increasingly restrictive, interpreta-
tion of "equivalence" became a key issue in the Zebley litigation."
The Listing of Impairments for adults is divided into thirteen sys-
tems or categories, such as musculoskeletal system, neurological, and
mental disorders. 62 It is not sufficient to have a condition that is named
in the listing. For example, sickle cell disease is a listed impairment,
but not everyone with sickle cell disease will meet the listing. Rather,
the disease must be accompanied by:
A. Documented painful (thrombotic) crises occurring at least
three times during the 5 months prior to adjudication; or
B. Requiring extended hospitalization (beyond emergency care)
at least three times during the 12 months prior to adjudication; or
C. Chronic, severe anemia with persistence of hematocrit of 26
percent or less; or
D. Evaluate the resulting impairment under the criteria for the
affected body system.6"
A claimant who is found to have an impairment which meets or equals
a listing is ruled disabled. Otherwise, for an adult (other than a claim-
ant for widows' benefits under SSA's regulations prior to 1991), the
sequential evaluation continues to step four.6
Step Four - Residual functional capacity and past relevant work.
At this stage the adjudicator makes a "medical assessment" of what
the adult claimant can do in a work setting, despite the claimant's
physical, mental, or other impairments. 65 This is the claimant's residual
functional capacity (RFC). The Supreme Court has previously noted
that this assessment of functional impairment is the key to the statu-
tory definition of disability: "The Social Security Act defines 'disabil-
ity' in terms of the effect a physical or mental impairment has on a
person's ability to function."66 Instead of determining the average func-
tional loss based upon a finite number of diagnostic categories, the dis-
ability program is meant to provide a "realistic, individual assessment
of each claimant's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity.
61
60. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). The impairment must also be ex-
pected to result in death or meet the twelve-month durational requirement. Id.; see also
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905 (1990).
61. See discussion infra Section IV.
62. 20 C.F.'R. Part 404, Subpart P app. 1 at 354-94 (1990).
63. Id. § 7.05 at 371.
64. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (1990).
65. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945 (1990) (defining residual func-
tional capacity (RFC)). Other impairments include "skin impairments, epilepsy, and
impairments of vision, hearing or other senses, postural and manipulative limitations,
and environmental restrictions which do not limit physical exertion." Id.
66. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. at 459-60.
67. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. at 474.
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The adjudicator must determine whether the claimant retains the
residual functional capacity to enable him or her return to past relevant
work. 8 If so, he or she is ruled not disabled. If not, the evaluation
proceeds to the fifth and final step.
Step Five - Other work. Finally, the adjudicator must consider
the claimant's residual functional capacity, along with age, education,
and past work experience. Based on all of these factors, the adjudicator
must determine whether the claimant can perform work other than
past relevant work. 9 If the claimant can perform a job that exists in
significant numbers 0 in the claimant's region or in several other re-
gions of the country, there will be a finding of not disabled. If the
claimant cannot perform other work, the claimant must be found
disabled. 71
The Zebley litigation challenged the Secretary's failure to apply
the five-step sequential evaluation of disability to child-claimants. Un-
like adults, children applying for SSI have, until now, been evaluated
using a listings only approach. The relevant section of the regulations
provided that a child under age eighteen is considered disabled if he or
she:
(a) Is not doing any substantial gainful activity; and
(b) Has a medically determinable physical or mental impair-
ment(s) which compares in severity to any impairment(s) which
would make an adult (a person age 18 or over) disabled. This re-
quirement will be met when the impairment(s)-
(1) Meets the duration requirement; and
(2) Is listed in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Part 404 of this
chapter; or
(3) Is determined by us to be medically equal to an impairment
listed in Appendix I of Subpart P of Part 404 of this chapter.7 1
No overall functional analysis of the impairments and their impact on
the individual child claimant was attempted or permitted. The Secre-
68. "We consider that your work experience applies when it was done within the
last 15 years, lasted long enough for you to learn to do it, and was substantial gainful
activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565(a), 416.965(a) (1990).
69. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f) (1990).
70. The term "significant numbers" is a term of art that also has created contro-
versy. Compare Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that 1350 to
1800 jobs available in the individual's region satisfied the "significant numbers" re-
quirement, even though those numbers only represented a small percentage of total jobs
in the region) with Leonard v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (concluding
that 4000 to 5000 jobs available nationwide was not a significant number).
71. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.152(f), 416.920(f) (1990). Where there are only exertional
limitations, the adjudicator may rely upon a series of charts, known as the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines (or "grids"), to make this ultimate determination. 20 C.F.R.
Subpart P App. 2 at 394-401 (1990). See also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. at 461.
72. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924.
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tary did recognize that, in some instances, the listings for adults are not
an appropriate standard to assess similarly impaired children. There-
fore, where the adult listings are inappropriate, there is a separate sec-
tion of listings to evaluate children under the age of eighteen." Even
these listings, however, require a level of impairment that excludes all
gainful activity in the vast majority of claimants.
For example as the listings stood, mental retardation could be
manifested in a young child by failure to achieve age-appropriate mile-
stones. Such developmental milestones may have little meaning for an
adult of age forty. However, a child with mental retardation can meet
the listing with "[a]chievement of only those developmental milestones
generally acquired by children no more than one-half the child's chron-
"174ological age ....
Nevertheless, a child who did not have a condition that met or
equaled a listed impairment was ruled to be not disabled, without fur-
ther consideration of residual functional capacity. In this regard, the
Secretary's regulations for children paralleled the regulations for the
disabled widow(er)'s program. To be eligible for benefits under that
program, the claimant also had to meet or equal a listing. 5 As with
children, the regulations provided for no assessment of residual func-
tional capacity of a widow. 7
6
IV. HISTORY OF THE ZEBLEY LITIGATION
A. The Named Plaintiffs
The cases of the three named plaintiffs illustrate the shortcomings
of the Secretary's approach. Brian Zebley was born with considerable
brain damage, resulting in retardation, spastic right hemiparesis, and
various musculoskeletal abnormalities. 7 At four years of age, he had
the gross motor skills of a child sixteen to nineteen months old and was
uncoordinated and prone to falling down.7 8 Despite these problems the
Secretary ruled against Brian because some of his developmental skills
were not quite delayed to the extent that the listings required (50% ).79
That he was more than 50% delayed in some areas was of no import.
Similarly, Joseph Love was denied benefits despite his organic
73. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, Part B.
74. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, Part B, Sec. 112.05(A) (1990).
75. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1577, 404.1578(a)(1) (1990).
76. As will be discussed infra Section VII, this too has given rise to significant
litigation challenging the legality of the disabled widows regulations.
77. Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 67, 70-71 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 490 U.S. 1064 (1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990).
78. Joint Appendix at 43-44, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990) (no. 88-
1377) [hereinafter Joint App.].
79. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, § 112.05(A) (1990).
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brain syndrome, severe adjustment disorder, neurological impairment
(severe hyperkinesis), and involuntary movemnents with visual and mo-
tor misperception.80 He failed -first grade three times and could not
even be controlled in a special education classroom, necessitating home
instruction." Joseph was denied benefits because the relevant listings
82
required deficits in four areas of function, and the Secretary deter-
mined that his self-care skills precluded him from meeting the listing
requirement.8" During discovery, one of the Secretary's psychiatric ex-
perts admitted that an adult with Joseph's profile would be considered.
disabled."4
Finally, Evelyn Raushi, a retarded child with an IQ of 62, was
denied benefits because the deficiencies that she exhibited were not sep-
arate from her retardation and therefore did not meet the Secretary's
listing requirement. 8
B. The Legal Background
The outlook for successful litigation of SSA's listings-only policy
was not favorable when Zebley was initiated. The Reagan Administra-
tion's conservative approach toward public benefits programs was at its
zenith, with many programs being deeply cut.86 The Social Security
disability programs were in the process of being purged of hundreds of
thousands of recipients and allowance rates for new applicants were at
their nadir.87 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit in Powell ex rel. Powell
v. Schweiker had ruled against a child-claimant in an action challeng-
ing the listings-only policy, 8 and the First Circuit in Hinckley ex rel.
Martin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services was about to fol-
low suit.89 In both cases the Secretary convinced the court of appeals to
defer to his rulemaking authority.
The cases showed how difficult it was to prevail against the Secre-
80. Joint App., supra note 78, at 52-53.
81. Id. at 50.
82. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, § 112.03-.04 (1990).
83. Joint App., supra note 78, at 51. (Joseph's mother testified that Joseph occa-
sionally helped with the dishes and normally took care of some of his personal needs).
84. Id. at 86-87.
85. Joint App., supra note 78, at 61-64; see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
App. 1, Part B, § 112 (1990).
86. See F. BLOCK, R. CLOWARD, B. EHRENREICH & F. PIVEN, THE MEAN SEA-
SON: THE ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE 22-25, 87 (1987).
87. Rains, supra note 54, at 7-8.
88. Powell ex rel. Powell v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir. 1982) (af-
firming Secretary's finding that 16-year-old classified as borderline retarded with some
functional skills was not disabled).
89. Hinckley ex rel. Martin v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 742 F.2d
19 (1st Cir. 1984) (denying plaintiffs' claim that the Secretary should also consider
nonmedical criteria when determining whether a child is disabled).
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tary, particularly in an area in which Congress left the Secretary sub-
stantial discretion. Even the most sympathetic plaintiffs, seriously im-
paired children, were not a guarantor of system-wide success.
Furthermore, the harshest individual examples of administrative injus-
tice were often overturned by the courts, threatening to moot the issue.
This left the impression that the Secretary's system had sufficient flexi-
bility to accommodate the worst cases, or at least that the courts would
catch the occasional aberration. For example, after all three named
plaintiffs in Zebley were remanded back to the Secretary and eventu-
ally awarded at least some relief,90 the district court concluded that the
problem was not systemic, but rather one of individual application.91
The Secretary himself eventually adopted this argument when pressed
by Congress, and presented a report that purported to show that any
problems with the childhood disability system resulted primarily from
faulty collection of evidence. 92
Powell and Hinckley did more than highlight the difficulties of
working from the facts of individual cases to class-wide issues. In both
cases, the courts perceived the plaintiffs' issues in a manner that made
it extremely difficult for the plaintiffs to prevail. This perception is
more fully articulated in Powell. There, the court recast plaintiff's at-
tack on the listings-only policy as one seeking "an alternative compara-
ble to vocational factors for adults."9 3 While not specifically mention-
ing steps four and five of the sequential evaluation process, the court
described the post-listings inquiry as one exclusively devoted to evaluat-
ing the claimant's age, education, and work experience as indicators of
the claimant's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity.94 It is all
too obvious that children do not have adverse vocational factors, which
is why the statute merely requires an inquiry into whether children
have an impairment of "comparable severity. '9 5 Even the dissent in
Powell, while criticizing the "denial of equal treatment," described the
evaluation of disability as a three step inquiry into whether the claim-
ant meets or equals the listings or whether vocational factors need to be
90. Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d at 76.
91. Zebley v. Heckler, 642 F. Supp. 220, 222 (E.D. Pa. 1986), vacated, 855 F.2d
67 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 490 U.S. 1064 (1989), afid, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990).
92. Social Security Administration, Office of Disability, Preliminary Staff Re-
port: Childhood Disability Study, Tab F, at 1 (Sept. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Staff Re-
port]. The Zebley dissent also embraced this view. 110 S. Ct. at 899 (White, J.,
dissenting).
93. Powell, 688 F.2d at 1360. The basic definition of disability as a physical or
mental impairment and the comparable severity test for children are found in 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); the age, education, and work experience restriction is found
in 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
94. See Powell, 688 F.2d at 1360; Hinckley, 742 F.2d at 22.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A)-(B).
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considered.96 Similarly, Hinckley, although acknowledging that child-
plaintiffs did not seek vocational evaluations, describes their desire for
consideration of non-medical criteria such as age, education, and func-
tional criteria.97 Nevertheless, because the plaintiffs were unable to
suggest the standards for these criteria, the court upheld the existing
"reasonable standards." 98
C. The Lower Court Decisions
In a brief opinion, the district court granted summary judgment to
the Secretary, reasoning:
Plaintiffs' argument may well be valid, in many cases; but er-
rors in applying the regulations in some cases do not demonstrate
invalidity of the regulations themselves. Part B of the Secretary's
listings of impairments, 20 C.F.R. § 416.925, is not facially invalid
or incomplete, seems to provide the necessary flexibility, and, in my
view, permits the award of benefits in conformity with the intent of
Congress. If these criteria are being misapplied or misinterpreted,
the remedy lies in the appeal process in individual cases, not in a
class action decree.
99
The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. Judge Mansmann wrote for
the court:
Congress has expressed unambiguously its intent that "any" im-
pairment which meets the statutory standard shall be found disa-
bling. Therefore, the Secretary's regulatory method for determining
disability must be adequate to identify any qualifying impairment.
The listings however, do not purport to be an exhaustive compi-
lation of medical conditions which could impair functioning to the
extent necessary to satisfy the statutory standard for liability. The
regulations recognize this by providing for individualized assessment
of the actual degree of functional impairment of adults whose medi-
cal findings do not entitle them to a presumption of disability by
meeting or equaling the listings. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e) and (f).
As we explained above, the regulations do not provide for such
individual assessment for children, although they are entitled by
statute to receive benefits if suffering from "any" impairment of
"comparable severity" to one which would render an adult unable to
engage in "substantial" gainful activity. It is the expressed intention
of Congress that children be given the opportunity to show that they
suffer from "any" impairment of "comparable severity" to one
which would actually, even if not presumptively, disable an adult.
Therefore we find that the regulations are inconsistent with the
96. Powell, 688 F.2d at 1363-64.
97. Hinckley, 742 F.2d at 22.
98. Id. at 23.
99. Zebley, 642 F. Supp. at 222.
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statute in precluding a finding that a child is disabled unless his im-
pairment meets or equals a listed one. 100
The Third Circuit recognized that its opinion "places us in the minority
among courts that have considered the legality of these regulations." 10'
D. The Grant of Certiorari
The holdings in Powell and Hinckley provided the basis for the
Secretary's strategy: to characterize plaintiffs as seeking a statutorily
unauthorized inquiry into vocational factors of child claimants, and
seeking an essentially non-medical inquiry into children's functional ca-
pabilities. Thus, even after the Third Circuit decision requiring a medi-
cally-based, functional evaluation, the Secretary presented the case as
one attempting to engraft non-medical functional factors into the chil-
dren's SSI program. In his petition for writ of certiorari, the Secretary
characterized the issue in the case as follows:
Whether Social Security disability regulations that base the determi-
nation on whether a child is disabled exclusively on medical factors
without also considering vocational factors used for adults are in-
consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A), which provides that a
child under the age of 18 shall be considered disabled if he suffers
from "any medically determinable physical or mental impairment of
comparable severity" to one that would entitle an adult to
benefits. 1oa
The challenge, then, was to demonstrate that there was more to the
inquiry into adult disability than the listings and vocational factors, a
position to which the Secretary has hinted, if not explicitly advanced,
in order to deny benefits to younger workers.108
E. Issues Before the Court
Although the Secretary sought to downplay the medical or func-
tional aspects of the evaluation of residual functional capacity, his reg-
ulations are clear on this point:
Your impairments may cause physical and mental limitations
that affect what you can do in a work setting. Your residual func-
100. Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d at 73-74 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 75.
102. Petition for writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at I, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990) (No. 88-1377) (emphasis
added).
103. Both Mental Health Ass'n. of Minn. v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 157 (D.
Minn. 1982), affd 720 F.2d 965 and Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467
(1986), initially concerned the validity of the Secretary's policy of denying disability
benefits to younger workers who did not have impairments which met the listings
requirements.
[Vol. 35:539
SULLIVAN v. ZEBLEY
tional capacity is what you can still do despite your limitations. If
you have more than one impairment, we will consider all of your
impairments of which we are aware. We consider your capacity for
various functions as described in the following paragraphs; (b) phys-
ical abilities, (c) mental impairments, and (d) other impairments.
Residual functional capacity is-a medical assessment. However, it
may include descriptions (even your own) of limitations that go be-
yond the symptoms that are important in the diagnosis and treat-
ment of your medical condition.104
This schizophrenic approach to what constitutes medical evidence, and
whether an evaluation of functional loss is a medical determination, is
part of a larger tension within the Social Security Administration. At
times, the Secretary has maintained that his listings not only consist of
medical criteria, but also mandate an inquiry into functional considera-
tions that are relevant in assessing the severity of impairment.10 5 Not
only did the Secretary assert this throughout his briefs, 0 6 but his own
policy pronouncements have stated as much. 10 At some points the Sec-
retary has encouraged his staff to supplement "medical factors" with
descriptions of "a child's activities, behavioral adjustment, and school
achievement," 108 while at others he has rejected indicators of functional
impact as "not within the scope of the law."' 19
As the American Medical Association and American Academy of
Pediatrics joint amicus brief made clear, no such bright line between
the diagnostic test results of some listings and assessment of functional
limitations exists in medical science." 0 However, by posing a sharp di-
104. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a) (1990) (emphasis added).
105. Brief for the Petitioner at 42, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990)
(No. 88-1377). For example, the Secretary cited:
[Listings] § 101.03(C) ("[ifnablity to perform age-related personal self-care
activities involving feeding, dressing, and personal hygiene"); § 111.06
("Persistent disorganization or deficit of motor function ... which ... inter-
feres with age-appropriate major daily activities"); § 112.03 (Psychosis re-
sulting in "marked restriction in the performance of daily age-appropriate
activities ... [and] deficiency of age-appropriate self-care skills").
Id.
106. See, e.g., id. at 15.
107. See 42 Fed. Reg. at 14,706 (1977) (listings-only approach justified on the
grounds that the Secretary was obligated to look only at medical factors, and not age,
education and work experience for children).
108. See, e.g., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security
Administration, SSA Disability Insurance Letter No. II-11 91 (Sept. 7, 1973); Disa-
bility Insurance Letter No. III-I 1 Supp. 1 at 96-99 (Jan. 9, 1974). More recently, the
Secretary has again announced his preference to consider special education evaluations
as medical evidence rather than as supplemental data. 55 Fed. Reg. 51,232 (1990) (to
be codified at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, Part B § 112.00(D).
109. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 14,706 (1977).
110. The amicus wrote: "The view that proper study or treatment of pediatric
illness and injury must include an assessment of the child's functional capacity to per-
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chotomy between "medical evidence" and "amorphous ... unspecified
non-medical factors . .. "1,I the Secretary argued that the courts
should defer to his technical expertise in the complex area of disability
evaluation.
A related question is the nature of the third step in the adult se-
quential evaluation process and the last step in the truncated children's
program: that of establishing disability by equaling a listed impair-
ment. The Secretary has occasionally used "equivalency" as a way to
award benefits in borderline cases, a device particularly employed by
ALJs, who are more independent than the non-lawyer adjudicators who
initially rule on applications. Furthermore, ALJs are more likely to be
aware of the impact of impairments on individual children by virtue of
their face-to-face contact with claimants. " 2 The earliest SSI children's
instructions urged adjudicators to make liberal use of equivalency as a
safety valve for difficult cases, particularly those involving unlisted im-
pairments or a combination of impairments. " However, SSA soon be-
gan to close this perceived loophole by introducing a concept of "medi-
cal equivalency." Thus, in 1977, the Secretary adopted a regulation
that defined "medical equivalence" as follows:
(a) An individual's impairment or impairments shall be deter-
mined to be medically the equivalent of an impairment listed in Ap-
pendix 1 to this Subpart I, only if the medical findings with respect
thereto are at least equivalent in severity and duration to the listed
findings of the listed impairment.
(b) Any decision with respect to disability made under the crite-
ria in § 416.901(b) as to whether an individual's impairment or im-
form age-appropriate activities is well accepted in the medical community." American
Medical Ass'n, American Academy of Pediatrics, Nat'l Org. for Rare Disorders, Inc.
and the Spina Bifida Ass'n of America as Amica Curiare in Support of Respondents at
5, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990) (No. 88-1377) (footnote omitted) [herein-
after A.M.A. Brief].
111. Brief for the Petitioner at 15, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990)
(No. 88-1377).
112. In all but a few cases, adjudicators do not see claimants. The exceptions are
potential termination cases, in which claimants have a right to a face-to-face reconsid-
eration. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1414, 416.1422. Applications and most reconsiderations are
taken by SSA personnel who have no disability adjudicative function. The Appeals
Council and federal court judges also do not have contact with claimants.
113. SSA Disability Insurance Letter No. III-11 Supp. 1 § V (Jan. 9, 1974)
instructed adjudicators as follows:
Case adjudication, particularly until the medical guides for evaluating child
claims are adequately refined, will depend heavily on the proper iase of a
"medical equivalency" concept which takes into account the particular ef-
fect of disease processes in childhood. In addition to the need for adjudicat-
ing under the "equals" concept where none of the adult listings can be ap-
plied, consideration must be given to the combined effect of multiple
impairments, each of which, singly, is short of the listings.
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pairments are medically the equivalent of an impairment listed in
Appendix 1 to this Subpart I, shall be based on medical evidence
demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diag-
nostic techniques, including a medical judgment furnished by one or
more physicians designated by the Social Security Administration,
relative to the question of medical equivalence. A "physician desig-
nated by the Social Security Administration" shall include a physi-
cian in the employ of or engaged for this purpose by the Social Se-
curity Administration or State agency authorized to make
determinations of disability. 14
Although the text is far from clear, it seems that the Secretary again
used his distinction between medical and functional evidence to avoid
giving adjudicators, particularly ALJs, too much discretion. Although
this subtle change at first went virtually unnoticed among advocates
and claimants, the results were dramatic. From 1976 to 1983,
equivalency allowances dropped 45.1 % to 8.3 %.115 The exact nature
of this medical equivalency policy only became clear in 1983, when the
Secretary published Social Security Ruling 83-19.11 6 There, the Secre-
tary laid out for the first time in a semi-public document his restrictive
policy. That policy:
1) Forbade an inquiry into functional limitations (such limitations
are not, after all, "medical").1 17
2) Required the ALJ to take into consideration the expert opinion
of the Secretary's designated physician.1
3) Clarified that the "level of severity" of impairments means the
degree of dysfunction for a particular listing. The "level of severity" of
impairments does not relate to residual functional capacity (RFC).
"For example, Listing 1.10(c) (inability to use a prosthesis effectively
.), relates only to the underlying medical disorder which prohibits
the use of the prosthesis and does not directly relate to the standing
114. 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (1977).
115. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., IST SESS., BACK-
GROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 46 (Sec. II, Table 2) (Comm. Print 1989).
Fiscal Equals Fiscal Equals Fiscal Equals
Year Listing Year Listing Year Listing
1975 43.9% 1980 16.2% 1985 9.2%
1976 45.1% 1981 12.3% 1986 8.7%
1977 41.9% 1982 8.6% 1987 10.2%
1978 31.9% 1983 8.3% 1988 11.0%
1979 22.7% 1984 8.7%
116. SSR 83-19 (Cum. Ed. 1983). Social Security Rulings are statements of pol-
icy that lack the force and effect of law or regulations. Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S.
870, 873 n.3 (1984). They were previously binding on all Social Security adjudicators.
117. SSR 83-19 at 106.
118. Id. at 107.
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and walking requirements ..... 119
4) Required looking only to the "most closely analogous" listing
for comparison in cases where an impairment is not listed. 120
5) Required that combination of impairment cases be adjudicated
by determining if the combination supplied the missing scores from a
particular listing. Again, "the functional consequences of impairments
• . . cannot justify a determination of equivalence."
12'
Ruling 8"3-19 made it clear that "equivalence" was to be strictly
construed, effectively preventing its use as a means of bringing needed
flexibility to the childhood-disability evaluation process. Moreover, it
clarified that children and disabled widows were to be judged by the
same standard, despite the different statutory criteria for measuring
their disabilities. Finally, Ruling 83-19 was significant because it was
retroactively applicable to claims made within three years of its August
1983 publication date. 22 This retroactive effect confirmed what some
advocates had suspected - the Secretary had been surreptitiously
tightening the childhood SSI program for some time.
The importance of the Secretary's equivalency policy was to be a
central issue before the Supreme Court. Despite Ruling 83-19, the Sec-
retary insisted that equivalency gave the program necessary flexibility
and reasonableness. 23 Of course, respondent children insisted that
equivalence offered no such promise. The question of how much impor-
tance to place on equivalence in general, and Ruling 83-19 in particu-
lar, was a difficult question for both sides. In a similar case, Marcus ex
rel. Rhyne v. Bowen, impaired children (and widows) won an impres-
119. Id. at 105.
120. Id. at 106. This concentration on one particular listing often led to wooden
decision making. See e.g., Wilkinson v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 660 (11 th Cir. 1987) (denying
benefits to a boy with a rare liver disorder that left him unable to eat, sleep, or leave
the house).
121. SSR 83-19 at 106 (emphasis in original). A few listings are in themselves
combination listings. For example, § 112.05 required an IQ of 60-69 and "another
serious" impairment. "Serious" is so open-ended that it allows an interpretation that
any condition short of a listing may be considered irrelevant, and no condition short of
a listing can make up for an IQ of 70 or more. "Another" was sometimes interpreted to
rule out children with mental health problems on the grounds that the mental health
problems are not separate from the retardation but merely a by-product of it.
122. By using an effective date of August 20, 1980, the Secretary apparently
intended to base SSR 83-19 upon the revision of the disability regulations promulgated
three years earlier. 45 Fed. Reg. at 55,506 (1980). Those regulations were fundamen-
tally a rewrite in plainer English undertaken as part of President Carter's Operation
Common Sense. The preamble disavowed any substantive changes, stating that "noth-
ing new has been added." 45 Fed. Reg. at 55,576 (1980). Furthermore, it specifically
disavowed any intention to change the Secretary's policy on equivalence. Id.
123. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 15 n.10, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885
(1990) (No. 88-1377).
124. 696 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. I11. 1988).
Where an impairment is not listed, it is even more difficult to see the List-
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sive victory by focusing on the medical equivalency test as an inappro-
priate substitute for evaluating functional limitations. However, such
an approach was fraught with danger: it invited the Secretary to make
last-minute, cosmetic changes in policy 12  to correct problems with the
evaluation process. The Marcus plaintiffs' strategy also diminished the
argument that children are not meant to be judged by the more strin-
gent standard used for widows.12
Fearing that a minor change in equivalence policy would do little
for many class members, the Zebley respondents argued that the equiv-
alence policy, as written, was but a small part of a larger problem -
the lack of a functional assessment for children. 1 Indeed, although the
Secretary represented to the Supreme Court that a review of equiva-
lence was underway and a clarification was possible, 2 8 no such policy
was adopted prior to the Court's decision.
F. Amicus Briefs
Amicus briefs supporting the respondents were filed by a large
number of advocacy groups for the disabled, medical organizations,
and twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia. There was a co-
ordinated effort to enhance the record to show the draconian way in
which the Secretary actually implemented the SSI children's program,
despite his protestations of flexibility. The brief filed by the medical
groups - the American Medical Association, the American Academy
ings criteria as dispositive of severity level since the evaluation of medical
impairments involves particularized understandings of how medical condi-
tions impair bodily functions and often cannot be translated into the limited
clinical indicia of other impairments.
Id. at 378 (footnote omitted).
125. Such a change has played a decisive role in the defense of the Secretary's
severity step (Step 2) of the sequential evaluation process, allowing him to avoid major
losses despite condemnation in the Courts of Appeal. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
at 145 n.4.
126. Willeford v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 824 F.2d 771 (9th Cir.
1987).
The standard [for widows] is stricter not only because it requires a survivor
to prove he or she is incapable of any gainful activity, substantial or not,
without reference to age, education, or work experience, but also because it
requires him or her to prove disability under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, rather than under a criterion specified in the statute.
Id. at 773.
127. Respondent's Brief at 32-33, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990) (No.
88-1377).
128. The Secretary represented that "consideration [was] being given to a possi-
ble clarification" of the equivalence policy. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 15 n. 10.
However, the Secretary never amended his equivalence policy, possibly because of the
ripple effects it would have on other disability programs, especially the widow's
program.
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of Pediatrics, National Organization for Rare Disorders, and Spina
Bifida Association - also demonstrated that the Secretary's approach
to childhood disability was contrary to acceptable medical evaluation
methods despite his assertions of technical expertise.129
A brief filed by Pennsylvania Protection and Advocacy and twenty
other advocacy organizations attacked the listings-only approach and
cited multiple examples of severely disabled children who had been de-
nied benefits.18 0 The Children's Defense Fund, allied organizations and
several named children adopted a similar approach, highlighting cases
in which no listings or an inadequate listing made eligibility particu-
larly difficult.'
The brief of the National Easter Seal Society, Muscular Dystro-
phy Association, National Down Syndrome Society, Voices for Illinois
Children and Plaintiff Class Members in Marcus v. Bowen demon-
strated that nothing is unworkable about a functional assessment stan-
dard for children, and that the Secretary's regulatory policy had not
been consistent and should not be entitled to deference by the Court.' 32
A novel brief filed by the United Handicapped Federation argued that
to uphold the SSI regulations would be to discriminate against disabled
children in possible violation of the Equal Protection guarantee of the
fifth amendment. 33
The National Organization of Social Security Claimants' Repre-
sentatives (NOSSCR) attacked the regulations and the Secretary's
self-contradictory litigation posture. The NOSSCR brief cited several
cases in which children were denied benefits until age eighteen, then
were granted benefits as of their eighteenth birthday, despite there be-
ing no change in their disabling conditions, in clear contravention of
the comparable severity standard.3
129. A.M.A. Brief, supra note 110, at 29.
130. Brief for the Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 36-47, Sullivan v.
Zebely, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990) (No. 88-1377).
131. Brief of Amici Curiae the Children's Defense Fund, Cystic Fibrosis Found.,
Spina Bifida Ass'n of Greater Los Angeles, Tourette Syndrome Ass'n, Rehabilitation
Presidents Council of Cal., Perla Acosta, Kenyada Ales, Dawn Boucher, Cheryl
Caudill, Sara Chase, Jennifer Cox, Blake Dewitt, Richard Doone, Yolanda Dowdy,
Amy Gifford, Lawrence Greatheart, Valerie Hartwell, Terry Houck, Deldrick Jackson,
Jeanette Toomey, Kendra Wheten at 7-33, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990)
(No. 88-1377).
132. Brief of the National Easter Seal Soc'y, Muscular Dystrophy Ass'n, Na-
tional Down Syndrome Cong., Voices for Ill. Children, and Plaintiff Class Members in
Marcus v. Sullivan, No. 85 C 453 (N.D. Ill.) as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents at 5, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990) (No. 88-1377).
133. Brief Amici Curiae of the Medical Issues Task Force of the United Handi-
capped Fed'n and the Ethics and Advocacy Task Force of the Nursing Home Action
Group in Support of Respondents, Brian Zebley, et al. at 5-7, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110
S. Ct. 885 (1990) (No. 88-1377).
134. Brief of the National Organization of Social Security Claimants' Repre-
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The partibipating states argued that the Secretary's unduly restric-
tive approach to children's SSI eligibility determinations shifted to the
states costs that Congress has decided should be borne at the federal
level. They also asserted that the Secretary's interpretation was clearly
inconsistent with the Social Security Act, and therefore, not entitled to
any deference.
1 3 5
G. Oral Argument Before the Court
Oral argument was held November 28, 1989. Under questioning,
the Secretary acknowledged that there may be children with impair-
ments not contained in the listings.'36 He asserted, however, that such a
child could still obtain benefits by showing that his impairments
equaled a listing. 3 7 He argued that respondents and their amici misun-
derstood how the listings work, and that it was not important that spe-
cific conditions were omitted, because all major body systems were
covered.' 8
When the Secretary was asked if there could be a case of a seven-
teen-and-a-half-year-old being ineligible for benefits, but then becom-
ing eligible upon reaching age eighteen, he admitted that this was pos-
sible. ' 9 He argued, however, that such a result would be caused by
additional non-medical vocational factors. 40 Of course, this was inac-
curate because a younger claimant is almost never considered to have
"adverse vocational factors"; such individuals are awarded benefits be-
cause their functional abilities are appraised.
The Court asked about the child with a combination of impair-
ments, none of which met or equaled a listing."' The Secretary argued,
inconsistently, that a combination of impairments would be considered,
but that the combination would nevertheless be compared to any listed
sentatives as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 12-17, Sullivan v. Zeb-
ley, 110 S. Ct. 885, n.17 (1990) (No. 88-1377). See Rains, Fair-Weather Friend of the
Court, TRIAL, Aug. 1990, at 57.
135. Brief of the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania; the States
of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, and Wyoming; and the District of Columbia, Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents at 10-31, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990) (No. 88-1377).
136. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885
(1990) (No. 88-1377) [hereinafter Transcript].
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id. at 9.
139. Id. at 13; see Rains, supra note 134, at 59.
140. Id. at 13-14. The Secretary never explained how an individual's age, educa-
tion, or work experience would be a more adverse vocational factor at age 18 than at
age 17. Id. See Rains, supra note 134, at 59.
141. Id. at 16-17.
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impairment."" He denied that Ruling 83-19 precluded consideration of
functional limitations in deciding whether impairments equaled the list-
ings, and he stated that the respondents had misconstrued Ruling 83-
19.1" He cited the Social Security Administration's own very recently
completed study that found 90% of the denials of claims brought on
behalf of children with mental impairments were correctly decided.1
4 4
Respondents, for their part, began their argument by emphasizing
that the Secretary's approach equated children's claims with those of
widows, despite the much more stringent statutory standard applicable
to widows' cases. The Court asked respondents whether, as asserted by
the Secretary, the equivalence determination allowed consideration of'
the functional impact of even multiple conditions. 4 5 Respondents
quoted from Ruling 83-19 which stated that "[t]he functional conse-
quences of impairments, irrespective of their nature or extent, cannot
justify a determination of equivalence.' 4  When asked whether delet-
ing this and similar language in other parts'of Ruling 83-19 would be
the end of the case, respondents acknowledged that it would go a long
way toward resolving the problems with the Secretary's approach. 147
Respondents pointed out, however, that because the listings are set at a
level of severity that precludes any gainful activity, rather than sub-
stantial gainful activity, even a more realistic assessment of equivalence
would leave some eligible children without benefits.
148
Respondents urged the Court to look at the language of Ruling
83-19 to determine the Secretary's actual policy regarding combina-
tions of impairments. 149 They also cited to the Court an example in an
amicus brief of a child with multiple impairments who had been denied
benefits because of failure to meet or equal a listing.150
In rebuttal, the Secretary emphasized that this was a facial chal-
142. Id. at 18. That is, the combination of impairments would not be compared
to the combination of relevant listings.
143. Id. at 20.
144. Id. at 21-22. The Secretary was referring to the Staff Report, prepared dur-
ing the litigation and filed with the Court. It found that the outcomes were correct
because the children did not meet the listings, which, of course, begs the question. See
Staff Report, supra note 92.
145. Transcript, supra note 136, at 24.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 26. This, of course, was akin to the holding in Marcus v. Bowen, 696
F. Supp. at 384. Just such a last minute revision in a Social Security ruling had led to
the crucial concurrence by Justice O'Connor in Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 155, in
which a majority of the Justices supported the Secretary's position.
148. Transcript, supra note 136, at 26-28.
149. Id. at 29-30.
150. Id. at 31 (describing "a child with severe hypertension, asthma and obes-
ity," as having "no where to turn" because "[e]ach set of symptoms is distinct, and
they don't cross over into other listings.")
[Vol. 35:539
SULLIVAN v. ZEBLEY
lenge to his regulations. 1' 1 He then made the error of attacking respon-
dent's use of illustrative cases, asserting that "the particular way in
which the equivalency concept might be applied in this case, or one
situation or another, is not before the Court. '1' 51 This prompted one
Justice to remark that the Secretary was treating this as though the
question of whether a regulation can be stricken on its face is the same
as whether a law can be stricken on its face as unconstitutional. 1 3 He
reminded the Secretary that a regulation "has to be valid in all of its
applications as written, at least."' 54
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
The Court's opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun for the seven-
Justice majority, represented a total vindication of the plaintiffs' posi-
tion through seven years of litigation. The Court unequivocally rejected
the Secretary's listings-only approach for children claiming SSI
benefits.' 6
After reviewing the statutory background, the Secretary's regula-
tions, and the procedural history of the cases, the Court noted that the
standard set forth in the listings was significantly harsher than in the
statute:
The Secretary explicitly has set the medical criteria defining the
listed impairments at a higher level of severity than the statutory
standard. The listings define impairments that would prevent an
adult, regardless of his age, education, or work experience, from per-
forming any gainful activity, not just "substantial gainful activity."
When the Secretary developed the child-disability listings, he
set their medical criteria at the same level of severity as that of the
adult listings. 1'
The Court then listed the numerous reasons that the listings-only
approach for children was more restrictive than the statutory standard:
First, the listings obviously do not cover all illnesses and abnor-
malities that actually can be disabling.
Second, even those medical conditions that are covered in the
listings are defined by criteria setting a higher level of severity than
the statutory standard, so they exclude claimants who have listed
impairments in a form severe enough to preclude substantial gainful
151. Id. at 35.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 39.
154. Id.
155. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. at 892-97.
156. Id. at 892 (emphasis in original).
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activity, but not quite severe enough to meet the listings level - that
which would preclude any gainful activity.
Third, the listings also exclude any claimant whose impairment
would not prevent any and all persons from doing any kind of work,
but which actually precludes the particular claimant from working,
given its actual effects on him - such as pain, consequences of med-
ication, and other symptoms that vary greatly with the individual -
and given the claimant's age, education, and work experience.
Fourth, the equivalence analysis excludes claimants who have
unlisted impairments, or combinations of impairments, that do not
fulfill all the criteria for any one listed impairment. 57
Although the shortcomings of the listings were remedied for adults
at the final steps, "[flor children there [was] no similar opportu-
nity." ' The Secretary's rigid approach precluded a realistic assess-
ment of those factors which actually disabled many children:
Children whose impairments are not quite severe enough to rise to
the presumptively disabling level set by the listings; children with
impairments that might not disable any and all children, but which
actually disable them, due to symptomatic effects such as pain, nau-
sea, side effects of medication, etc., or due to their particular age,
educational background, and circumstances; and children with un-
listed impairments or combinations of impairments that are not
equivalent to any one listing - all these categories of child claim-
ants are simply denied benefits, even if their impairments are of"comparable severity" to ones that would actually (though not pre-
sumptively) render an adult disabled.159
The problem could not be corrected by merely improving the
listings:
Even if the listings were set at the same level of severity as the stat-
ute, and expanded to cover many more childhood impairments, no
set of listings could ensure that child claimants would receive bene-
fits whenever their impairments are of "comparable severity" to ones
that would qualify an adult for benefits under the individualized,
functional analysis contemplated by the statute and provided to
adults by the Secretary.160
The Court rejected the Secretary's argument that the listings-only
approach is the only practicable way to determine comparability:
The Secretary's claim that a functional analysis of child disability
claims is not feasible is unconvincing. The fact that a vocational
157. Id. at 893 (paragraphing added) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 894.
159. Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, "[tihe child-disability
regulations are simply inconsistent with the statutory standard of 'comparable sever-
ity.'" Id.
160. Id. at 896 (emphasis in original).
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analysis is inapplicable to children does not mean that a functional
analysis cannot be applied to them. An inquiry into the impact of an
impairment on the normal daily activities of a child of the claimant's
age - speaking, walking, washing, dressing, and feeding oneself, go-
ing to school, playing, etc. - is, in our view, no more amorphous or
unmanageable than an inquiry into the impact of an adult's impair-
ment on his ability to perform "any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy . .. ."16
The Court clearly mandated an individualized assessment of
residual functional capacity for children who do not meet or equal a
listing:
Finally, the Secretary's insistence that child claimants must be as-
sessed from "a medical perspective alone, without individualized
consideration of ...residual functional capacity," seems to us to
make little sense in light of the fact that standard medical diagnostic
techniques often include assessmhent of the functional impact of the
disorder.'
Justice White, joined in his dissent by Justice Rehnquist, opined
that the Court failed to give adequate deference to the Secretary's
broad rule-making authority. 163 The dissent would have relegated chil-
dren whose impairments did not meet or equal a listing to individual
court appeals of their cases:
In any event, rather than declaring the regulations wholly or partly
void on their face, the Court would be better advised to insist on
children making out their claims in individual cases; only then can a
court confidently say that the medically identifiable impairment,
though neither a listed impairment nor its equivalent, is nevertheless
of "comparable severity" and hence disabling when considered with
nonmedical factors.'e
The dissenters never did clarify how the two standards, regulatory
and statutory, would continue to co-exist if they were not co-extensive.
As the majority noted:
The dissent proposes the children who fail to qualify for benefits
under the Secretary's current approach can simply "make their case
before the Secretary, and take the case to court if their claims are
rejected .... ." We fail to see why each child denied benefits because
his impairment falls within the several categories of impairments
161. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 897 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
163. Justice White stated: "We should .. .first ask whether Congress has ex-
pressed a clear intent on the question at issue .... If not, as I think is the case, we
should defer to the agency's interpretation as long as it is permissible." 110 S. Ct. at
897 (White, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 899.
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that meet the statutory standard but do not qualify under the Secre-
tary's listings-only approach, should be compelled to raise a sepa-
rate, as-applied challenge to the regulations, or why a facial chal-
lenge is not a proper response to the systemic disparity between the
statutory standard and the Secretary's approach to child disability
claims.16 5
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISION
The Supreme Court's decision left both the Secretary and the Zeb-
ley plaintiffs with many issues to resolve. Not only was the Secretary
left with the obvious task of creating a new scheme to adjudicate disa-
bility for- children in accordance with the Court's holding, but there
were several difficult and controversial unresolved questions concerning
class relief. These questions included:
1) How were children's cases to be decided in the interim until a
new set of regulations were adopted?
2) Should all children denied benefits under the Secretary's illegal
standard be eligible for readjudication? 66
3) Should class members get an automatic readjudication of their
claims, or should they have to come forward and request
readjudication?
4) Should allowances be made in the readjudication process for
the time that had passed and the difficulty of proving eligibility for past
years?
5) Since SSI eligibility is related to Medicaid eligibility, should
the remedial order of the district court address this vital issue?
In addition to these key issues, there were many others, including
notice, clearance of subregulatory instructions, and outreach. Unfortu-
nately, the Secretary took an aggressive position that sought to limit his
liability, requiring further litigation and the expenditure of considera-
ble resources. It took a full year to develop a new set of regulations 16 7
to evaluate childhood disability and to forge a compromise that would
address all of the concerns.
165. Id. at 894 n.18.
166. Although the district court had certified a nationwide class it did not specify
a start date for the class. The class was defined as:
All persons who are now, or who in the future will be, entitled to an admin-
istrative determination (whether initially, on reconsideration, or on reopen-
ing) as to whether supplemental security income benefits are payable on ac-
count of a child who is disabled, or as to whether such benefits have been
improperly denied, or improperly terminated, or should be resumed.
Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d at 71.
167. 56 Fed. Reg. 5534 (1991).
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A. Interim Procedures
Shortly following the Supreme Court's decision, it became clear
that a temporary "Interim Standard" would be needed to adjudicate
the cases that were currently before the Secretary and those that would
be filed before regulations could be promulgated. After negotiation and
agreement with plaintiffs' counsel, and with court approval, SSA issued
an Interim Standard effective immediately, which established a new
Zebley functional assessment step beyond the listings, and that re-
scinded prior restrictive policies requiring that claimants' impairments
"equal" the listings. 168 The new Interim Standard greatly expanded the
breadth of equivalency allowances and was to remain in effect until
SSA published Interim Final Regulations in the Federal Register.
In addition to adopting a functional assessment test, the Interim
Standard was accompanied by procedures to be used in deciding cases
until a regulation was published. 69 The first step in the appeal process
after the initial denial was still reconsideration. Reconsideration deci-
sions, like initial determinations, are made by the State Disability De-
termination Service (DDS). If, on reconsideration, the State DDS de-
cided that a child met or equaled the listings or met the Interim
Standard, it was to send the case to SSA to issue a favorable decision.
Otherwise, the State DDS was to hold the child's case for review once
the final regulations were in place.'
If a child had already appealed from an adverse reconsideration
decision and was. awaiting a hearing before an ALJ, the case could, at
the behest of the ALJ, be sent back to the State DDS for further re-
view and development of additional evidence under Zebley. On the
other hand, the ALJ could hear the case and issue a favorable decision.
Unfavorable decisions, however, were not to be released. If the child
had had a hearing but had not yet received a decision, the child would
receive a favorable decision if the ALJ concluded that he or she "met
or equaled" the listings or met the Interim Standard. Otherwise, the
168. See Social Security Administration Interim Standard: Claimants for SSI
Disabled Children's Payments. (May 3, 1990). The first eight months of operation
showed a dramatic increase in allowances, with an overall rate in the 60% range, al-
though a few states, most notably Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin were ap-
parently slower to appreciate the import of the new policy with allowance rates in the
25-45 % range. Social Security Administration: Initial Claims, Initial and Reconsidera-
tion Levels of Adjudication Counts for Blind and Disabled Children By State From 6/
02/90 Thru [sic] 1/31/91 (on file with authors). Eventually the class received an
agreed upon order stating the 10 lowest allowance states would be subject to intensified
central office scrutiny to ensure that they were properly implementing the new rules.
Stipulation and Order (Feb. 4, 1991).
169. Zebley v. Sullivan, No. 83-3314 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 1990) (Stipulation and
Order).
170. Id. at 11 2, 3.
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child's claim was to be held in abeyance.'
In any event, every pending or newly filed case would be re-evalu-
ated under the regulation. Once it was published and the normal rights
of appeal were available, the Secretary also insisted that allowances
under the Interim Standard were subject to normal reopening
171procedures.
B. The Development of a New' Regulatory Standard
Having lost decisively to a very sympathetic class, the Secretary
quickly announced that he intended to develop new regulations by Au-
gust 31, 1990, approximately six months after the Supreme Court's de-
cision.17 3 Soon thereafter, the Secretary and the Commissioner an-
nounced that they planned to convene an Ad Hoc Work Group on
Childhood Disability ("Work Group") of some eighteen experts in the
field of children's health.7 4 The Work Group was composed primarily
of twelve pediatricians and pediatric specialists, although the group
also contained a social worker, a pediatric nurse specializing in home
and community care, a physical therapist, a speech and communica-
tions therapist, and two psychologists. Although most members of the
Work Group were independent of SSA, at least three members of the
Work Group were SSA employees or agents, and the Work Group was
chaired by an SSA official. The Work Group met three times in Wash-
ington, D.C. for a total of eight days.' 75
171. Id.
172. Le., they could be reversed, to account for possible differences between the
Interim Standard and the published regulation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1487.
173. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Proposed Remedial Order at 6-7,
Zebley v. Sullivan, No. 83-3314 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1990). Such a schedule was remark-
ably fast for the Department of Health and Human Services, although DHHS had
moved very quickly in the past, for example, in implementing the sweeping changes in
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, by
promulgating broad regulations that drastically cut the AFDC program some two
months after enactment. 46 Fed. Reg. 46,750 (1981). See Philadelphia Citizens in Ac-
tion v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877 (3rd Cir. 1982) (upholding emergency regulations
promulgated without public notice and comment).
174. HHS News: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Press Release
(March 23, 1990). The Secretary explained the purpose of the Work Group: "It is our
intention that these experts advise us of a fairer medically feasible method of determin-
ing childhood disabilities." Id.
175. Meeting of the Ad Hoc Work Group on Childhood Disability, convened by
Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary for Dept. of Health and Human Services, and Gwendolyn
S. King, Commissioner for Social Security Administration (Apr. 16-17, May 3-5, and
June 28-29, 1990) [hereinafter Work Group]. Despite the advisory role of the Work
Group, SSA took the position that it was not convened under the authority of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §§ 1-15 (1988), but rather that
each Work Group member was an independent consultant working directly for the Sec-
retary but meeting together. This avoided the requirement of FACA, including, inter
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The charge of the Work Group was to advise the Secretary as to
how to design a new system for the adjudication of childhood disability
benefits that would be fair and medically appropriate. They quickly
came to agree that the Secretary's listings-only policy made little sense
from a medical point of view and that the listings themselves were woe-
fully out of date and incomplete, even as a partial guide for adjudica-
tion. Indeed, several members of the Work Group were of the opinion
that the listings were so inadequate that they should be discarded. 17
Eventually a consensus developed in the Work Group to drop this oppo-
sition to the listings, with the clear understanding that the agency
would do more to make the listings more realistic and up-to-date and
with the understanding that they would be used only to streamline1
77
the adjudicative process, awarding benefits quickly to those who were
clearly entitled."7
Indeed, the inadequacies of the listings were returned to at almost
alia, the need to hold public meetings and to allow for participation by the public. 5
U.S.C. App. 2 § 10(a)(1) (1988). Without conceding the applicability of FACA,
SSA's General Counsel agreed to allow public attendance; in addition, plaintiff's coun-
sel was allotted time to address the Work Group, but not to participate in discussions.
176. Id.*
177. The Secretary's performance in promulgating listings and keeping them up
to date has been particularly poor, and marked by long, unexplained delay. Despite
almost a two-year lead time, SSA did not have children's listings available when the
SSI program was inaugurated on January 1, 1974, and did not publish children's list-
ings until ordered to do so by an impatient Congress in 1976. Unemployment Compen-
sation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 501(b), 90 Stat. 2667, 2683
(1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 53,042 (1976), (codified at 20 C.F.R. pts 404, 416) (proposed
Dec. 3, 1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 14,705 (1977). Some of the adult and child listings were
revised in 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 18,170 (1979). A few others were revised in 1985. 50
Fed. Reg. 50,068 (1985). Both times the changes were minor. In 1984 Congress again
required the Secretary to promulgate "realistic" listings for mental impairments as
part of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act (SSDBRA) of 1984. Pub. L.
No. 98-460, § 5(a), 98 Stat. 1794, 1801 (1984). SSDBRA required adoption of new
mental impairment listings within 120 days of passage of the Act (October 9, 1984).
Proposed regulations were published on February 4, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 4,948 (1985).
Final rules were not adopted until August 28, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 35,038 (1985). Al-
though the Secretary promised to make similar revisions to the children's listings, he
successfully took the position in the district court and Third Circuit that he was not
required to do so. Zebley ex rel. Zebley v. Bowen, 855 F.2d at 76-77. Proposed mental
impairment listings for children were not promulgated until August 14, 1989. 54 Fed.
Reg. 33,238 (1989). At that time, Zebley was before the Supreme Court, and the
Secretary argued that the publication of the proposed listings resolved what few inequi-
ties existed, and demonstrated that the plaintiffs challenge was misguided. See Reply
Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990) (No. 88-1377).
A final regulation was not promulgated until December 12, 1990, 55 Fed. Reg. 51,204,
almost a year after the date the Secretary led the Court to believe was likely. Overall,
such performance suggests that the listings are driven less by medical and legal con-
cerns than by politics, litigation strategy and budgetary considerations.
178. Work Group, supra note 175.
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every session of the Work Group, with many of the experts expressing
wonder that they could not be kept more up-to-date, made more com-
plete or more even in their level of severity. 179 Even the listings of
which SSA is most proud - the recently finalized and long awaited
Down Syndrome listing' 80 and the mental impairment listing,18' which,
although styled a listing, is much more flexible and functionally ori-
ented - were unreasonably delayed. Only after public outcry were at-
tention deficit disorders and personality disorders added to the
listings. 82
Partly due to their distrust of the listings, the experts urged SSA
to adopt one or more "screens" that would award benefits to children
with the most serious impairments.'88 Such screens would avoid the
need for lengthy and sometimes costly development of evidence and
award benefits quickly. Although this idea was slow to gain acceptance
at first, partly because of fear on the part of some experts of creating a
"super listing" that would have the same problems as the listings, the
experts eventually reached a consensus that such an approach could be
both fair and efficient. SSA medical staff also seemed to accept the
notion. 8 When the first formal draft of the regulations was circulated
to the Work Group in June 1990, however, no notion of screens was
included in the regulations. Instead, the regulations embodied a more
traditional approach, using only existing listings, supplemented by a
more flexible analysis of functional limitations and risk factors.
Pursuant to the advice of the experts, the draft regulations divided
children into several age groups and measured the functional limita-
tions of each age group against different standards. Thus, infants and
toddlers were to be evaluated in terms of their failure to achieve ex-
pected developmental milestones, such as turning the head to follow a
noise, or walking and talking. Preschoolers were to be assessed in terms
of their participation in age-appropriate activities, and older children
and teenagers were to be assessed in terms of their daily living activi-
ties. Overall, any limitations in the ability to function were to be as-
sessed in terms of whether they imposed, or could be expected to im-
pose, significant limitations comparable in severity to that which could
disable an adult. 85 In actuality, for all but the 16-18 group, children's
179. Id.
180. 55 Fed. Reg. 51,208 (1991) (codified at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, App. 1, Part B
§ 110.00, 110.06).
181. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,230 (1990) (codified at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, App. 1, Part B
§ 112).
182. SSA has been steadfast in its refusal to modify the listings throughout the
protracted drafting process. See discussion in 55 Fed. Reg. at 51,226.
183. Work Group, supra note 175.
184. Id.
185. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a).
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disabilities are to be evaluated in terms of the impact on the develop-
mental domains.186
Eventually the Work Group refined their proposal for a screen
down to a single document"' more functionally based than the listings,
although some of the screen criteria overlapped the listings'88 and
others seemed more appropriate for new listings, 89 given their specific-
ity. Instead, the SSA draft followed the consensus of the Work Group
of conceptualizing childhood into five age groups: (1) newborn and
younger infants (birth to age 1); (2) older infants and toddlers (age 1
to age 3); (3) preschoolers (ages 3 to 6); (4) school age children (ages 6
to 12) and (5) adolescents (ages 12 up to 18).19 ° Despite the urging of
the Work Group to ensure that the classifications not be applied too
rigidly, the SSA proposal did not mention age group flexibility. The
proposal did, however, follow closely the Work Group suggestion to
evaluate function somewhat differently for the different groups. In gen-
eral, the draft regulations sought to measure the effect of an impair-
ment on the ability to function "independently, appropriately and effec-
tively in an age-appropriate manner"'191 such that function was
"significantly" reduced or, for the youngest children, could be "reason-
ably expected" to be so reduced. 192 This in turn was to be appraised in
terms of the impact on:
(1) Your ability to grow, develop,' or mature physically, men-
tally, or emotionally and, thus, to attain developmental milestones at
an age-appropriate rate; or
(2) Your ability to grow, develop, or mature physically, men-
tally, or emotionally and, thus, to be able to engage in age-appropri-
186. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924c.
187. The Initial Screen List organized conditions into five broad areas: biological
conditions, conditions involving developmental milestones, conditions requiring assistive
devices, conditions involving mental/emotional/social factors, conditions involving ex-
traordinary situations, and conditions specific to infants. SSA, Summary of the Views
of the Childhood Disability Experts, May 3-5, 1990, Attachment 2.
188. For example, the list of screens included blindness and deafness, both of
which are included in the listings, at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P App. 1, Part B,
88 102.02, 102.08 (1990).
189. For example, AIDS, terminal illnesses, congenital anomalies, and chromo-
somal disorders would all seem to merit their own listings.
190. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(b).
191. Id. at 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a).
192. Id. The latter term was a crucial one and reflected the advice of the Work
Group and advocates to address the problem identified by the Supreme Court, of deny-
ing children who were too young to test under the criteria laid out in the Listing.
Zebley, 110 S. Ct. at 894 n. 17. For example, infants with Down Syndrome were fre-
quently turned down because they could not be given an IQ test. Original SSA drafts
extended this sensible rule to all children too young to be fully evaluated, but subse-
quent drafts pulled back from this formulation and restricted the "reasonable expecta-
tion" analysis to infants from birth to one year old.
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ate activities of daily living in self-care, play and recreation, school
and academics, vocational settings, peer relationships, or family life;
or
(3) Your ability to acquire the skills needed to assume roles
reasonably expected of adults; or
(4) Your ability to acquire age-appropriate skills and perform
age-appropriate activities at a reasonable rate and with reasonable
efficiency. 198
For young children (birth to age 3), developmental milestones were to
be appraised in six "domains": mobility, manipulation, sensation and
perception, communication, cognition, and social/emotional behav-
ior. 94 Older preschoolers (3-6) were also to be appraised in develop-
mental terms of age-appropriate activities in these six areas. On the
other hand, school-age children and adolescents were to be appraised in
terms of their activities of daily living in five areas, namely self-care,
play, school, peer relationships, and family life.' 95
Such a framework for the evaluation of disability goes a long way
toward affording children the individualized functional assessment to
which the Supreme Court said they are entitled. It is, however,
weighted toward the evaluation of impairments whose impact is pri-
marily developmental. This is not altogether surprising, since the Work
Group was primarily composed of developmentalists, 196 but even they
warned that the decisional process should reflect the needs of the esti-
mated 30% of disabled children suffering from physical impairments.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Supreme Court held that
the listings were not only incomplete, but also that they were set at a
level higher than statutorily required. 9 Any regulation consistent with
that decision must allow eligibility for children who do not meet the
listings.
The SSA proposal attempted to deal with such issues by articulat-
ing a number of special factors to consider'" as well as complicating
risk factors. SSA drafters gave assurances that the presence of one of
the considerations should be determinative and that the presence of a
193. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a.
194. This concept of domains was first suggested by the Work Group. Work
Group, supra note 175.
195. These rough divisions were developed by SSA rather than the Work Group.
196. Of the 18 members of the Work Group, 10 specialized in child develop-
ment, education, child psychiatry, or child psychology, and concentrated primarily on
development. Moreover, of the non-developmentalists, four were non-physicians who
had difficulty being heard by the physician-dominated group. Work Group, supra note
175.
197. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. at 892. The listings are set at a level that precludes any
gainful activity, while the statute only requires the inability to engage in substantial
gainful activity.
198. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(c).
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risk factor would lead to a conclusion of disability in a close case. The
considerations included the following: (1) chronic illness (frequent or
long hospitalizations 199 or frequent outpatient care); (2) effects of
structured or highly supportive environment
00 (3) other adaptations;201
(4) effects of medication 20 1 (5) treatment, in general;2 03 and (6) school
attendance. 0 Finally, SSA described certain risk factors, ranging from
the biological and health related, to the family and environmental. Use
of such risk factors, a familiar concept for pediatricians, was strongly
supported by the Work Group.20 5 The experts argued that assessment
of risk was essential to ultimate future developments and the course of
impairments. Such assessments were seen as crucial to meeting the
goal of making SSI a preventive program and at least partially over-
coming the too-young-to-test problem. 0
Although these considerations all reflected Work Group thinking
and attempted to capture several elements of the proposed screens, con-
cern remained that the considerations were incomplete and too vague,
and that adjudicators would give them too little weight. SSA officials
responded that the list was not exclusive, and that they would consider
tightening the language to make it clear that the presence of such spe-
cial factors alone was always meant to be determinative of disability.
Finally, and not surprisingly, given the interdisciplinary nature of
the Work Group, there was a solid consensus that evidence should be
accepted from a wide variety of sources. Despite some opposition from
SSA medical staff that only "medical" evidence should be considered,
members of the Work Group constantly spoke of gathering evidence
199. SSA suggested that, for the treatment of the disabling condition, two long
hospitalizations in a year, or three or more shorter ones, would suffice. Regular and
time consuming care or therapy that interfered significantly with normal activities
would, for the first time, be recognized as pointing toward a finding of disability. Id. at
20 C.F.R. §416.924(a)(c)(1).
200. Such "propping up" of a child often enhances the child's ability to function,
and was a frequent topic of Work Group and advocate discussion. The inclusion was
meant to parallel the provision for mentally impaired adults. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, App. 1, Part A, § 12.00(H).
201. For example, other adaptations could include the use of wheelchairs, exter-
nal feeding apparatus, or urinary assistive devices, whose presence would impede nor-
mal function.
202. The Supreme Court specifically mentioned this as a missing factor. Zebley,
110 S. Ct. at 894.
203. Unlike the other factors, evidence of successful treatment could lead to a
finding of not disabled. SSA officials asserted that it was included for "balance."
204. This made several points: first, that school records provide a "rich" source
of evidence; second, that school attendance is not proof that someone is not disabled;
and third, that long or repeated impairment-related absence would be strong evidence
of inability to function.
205. Work Group, supra note 175.
206. The other way to deal with this problem was the insertion of the "reasona-
bly expected to significantly reduce" language in 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) (1990).
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from every available source. Great emphasis was placed on school
records, although several members cautioned that schools had a vested
interest in understating disabilities and ignoring physical limitations
not directly affecting academic performance."" The early draft regula-
tions drew from this consensus and attempted to lay to rest the long-
standing controversy over the nature of acceptable medical evidence.
Of course, getting adjudicators to consider "non-medical" evidence
carefully will most likely be difficult.
C. The Promulgation of Regulations
The Interim Final Regulations were finally published on February
11, 1991, to take effect immediately.2 0 8 There were few, if any major
departures from the earlier drafts, although there were a number of
significant developments.
The Interim Final Regulations make it clear that SSA will evalu-
ate children's impairments using a sequential evaluation very much like
that used for adults." 9 First, there is an inquiry to determine whether
the claimant is working. If he or she is performing substantial gainful
activity, the claim is, of course, denied. Second, the Secretary will in-
quire as to whether the claimant suffers from a "severe" impairment.
Only those whose impairment is severe, that is, have more than a mini-
mal limitation in ability to function in an age-appropriate manner, will
be allowed to proceed. Third, the Secretary will determine whether the
child has an impairment that meets or equals a listed impairment.
Those meeting or equaling a listing will be awarded benefits, as before,
although the new regulation creates a new concept of functional
equivalency.210 Finally, if no listing is met or equaled, the Secretary
must determine whether the child has an impairment of comparable
severity to that which would disable an adult. This is done through an
"individualized functional assessment" (IFA) that corresponds to the
evaluation of residual functional capacity (RFC) in adults and at-
tempts to measure the impact of the impairment on the ability to func-
tion "independently, appropriately and effectively in an age appropriate
207. School districts are responsible for providing for appropriate individualized
educational programs for all handicapped children. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988).
School districts have a financial incentive to be conservative in identifying handicap-
ping conditions and in evaluating their significance, since upon evaluation they must
provide special programs to deal with the conditions.
208. 55 Fed. Reg. 5534. Final regulations to be promulgated after a period of
public comment are to be adopted fourteen months after the close of the comment
period. Stipulation and Order II. The due date is September 8, 1992, since the com-
ment period was extended by Commissioner King to July 8, 1991.
209. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b).
210. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(3).
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manner." '' This is the heart of what the Supreme Court found was
missing for children.
The new IFA rules concentrate on functional limitations, evaluat-
ing them in terms of developmental norms, domains of behavior, age
appropriate activities, and, for children 16-18, by evaluating those limi-
tations as they would affect young adults. 212 Limitations in these
spheres are generally evaluated across a spectrum that ranges from
mild, to moderate, to marked, and finally to extreme for children 3-
16;213 for children 0-3, function is evaluated in the same terms but is
further refined by equating degrees of limitation to the degree of devel-
opmental delay. 14 Thus, children functioning at a level of one-half to
two-thirds of their chronological age are said to have an impairment of
marked severity; children whose developmental delay is between two-
thirds and three-quarters are categorized as moderately impaired. 15
SSA then goes on to say, that as a "guideline," children with func-
tional limitations in two spheres at the marked level, or, in one sphere
at the extreme level, have listing level impairments. However, since the
listings are set at a high level of impairment, children with better func-
tion may still be found disabled. For young children, age 0-3, the rule
is to find the child disabled if development is delayed to the point
where function in one domain is markedly impaired and in another do-
main is moderately impaired or where function in three domains is
moderately impaired. 216 Although such rules will, in the hands of some
adjudicators, become little more than a mechanistic formula, rather
than mere "guidelines," they are, at the very least, considerably more
liberal and inclusive than the former listings-only approach. The cat-
211. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(0.
212. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e.
213. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(b).
214. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(b)(1).
215. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(c).
216. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924e(c)(1), (2).
217. The following chart illustrates how the guidelines should work. Each axis of
the chart represents a separate functional domain, so that if a child was impaired in
motor function and cognitive ability one would assign one axis to each and then locate
the degree of functional loss for each domain.
Mild Moderate Marked Extreme
mild No No ? ?
moderate No * Yes Yes
(3 moderates will
lead to a finding
of disability)
marked ? Yes Yes
IFA Listing Yes
extreme ? Listing Listing
Yes Yes Yes
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egorization of functional impairments as mild, moderate, marked or ex-
treme is obviously difficult, but of crucial importance. Those familiar
with the mental listings218 will recognize the terms which have been
borrowed and the elusive definition of the pivotal term "marked":
Where "marked" is used as a standard for measuring the de-
gree of limitation, it means more than moderate but less than ex-
treme. A marked limitation may arise when several activities or
functions are impaired, or even when only one is impaired, as long as
the degree of limitation is such as to interfere seriously with the abil-
ity to function (based upon age-appropriate expectations) indepen-
dently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis. When
standardized tests are used as the measure of functional parameters,
a valid score that is two standard deviations below the norm for the
test will be considered a marked restriction.219
The task of the advocate will be to convince the adjudicator to apply
this rather vague benchmark to a variety of functional limitations.
In addition to these guidelines, there are other considerations that
may tip the scales. These other "factors" include chronic illness, effects
of medication, effects of structured or highly supportive settings, adap-
tations, the need for complex or time consuming therapies, and school
attendance. 220 The idea behind all of these factors is to ensure that a
realistic picture of a child's function is obtained and that trade-offs are
fully taken into account. That is, when increased function is obtained
only under artificial conditions or when functional improvement is due
to treatment that creates side effects or other problems, both are evalu-
ated. For example, a child with cystic fibrosis needing two or three
hours of daily therapy to keep her lungs clear may have increased
breathing function, but only at the expense of a loss of energy and time
to engage in other activities.
The only other factor that does not fit into this general approach is
school attendance, which because it is central to the lives of most chil-
dren, must be addressed. For want of any other place to address it, it is
inserted here. The regulation 21 makes it clear that even regular school
attendance is not per se evidence of non-disability. Rather, the touch-
Boxes marked "yes" qualify for disability, either under the listings or the IFA, as set
forth in the regulations. Boxes with question marks are unclear as to result. Boxes with
"no" are those in which SSA would deny benefits.
218. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, Parts A & B, Listing §§ 12.00,
112.00,
219. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, Part B, Listing § 112.00(c).
220. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924d. Notably lacking from the listing of factors is the
consideration of pain and other "subjective" factors, such as dizziness or nausea despite
the Court's explicit recognition that pain and other symptoms could prove dispositive.
110 S. Ct. at 894. The regulation is open-ended; it remains to be seen if adjudicators
will use it in an open-ended fashion.
221. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924d(g).
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stones are the circumstances of school attendance and the ability to
function independently in a classroom setting in an age-appropriate
manner. Moreover, inability to attend school regularly should be con-
sidered indicative of disability.
The new sequential evaluation process, with the incorporation of
an individualized functional assessment, is obviously meant to parallel
the process used for adults. The most controversial portion of the chil-
dren's sequential evaluation process is the process of a step two severity
screen that disqualifies claimants who do not suffer from a "severe"
impairment. Although the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
adult severity step in Bowen v. Yuckert,222 such a step in the evaluation
process is not mandated by the Act, nor was a severity step required by
the Supreme Court's Zebley decision, which did not call for compara-
ble treatment, but for the award of benefits to children with disabilities
of comparable severity. Claimants' representatives have long been criti-
cal of the severity step and its abuse during the early 1980s.223
Further, since the Supreme Court's decision did not mandate a
severity step, the failure to observe the normal rulemaking process of
proposing a severity step and taking public comment seems to be a vio-
lation of the Administrative Procedure Act.224 Such a violation arises
from the lack of good cause for dispensing with the normal rulemaking
procedure. 225 A reading of the preamble to the new regulation shows
that SSA was concerned about the legality of the adoption of a new
severity step and anticipatorily defended the severity step for children
as complying with the "spirit" and "tenor" of the Zebley holding. 2 6 It
is doubtful that the spirit of Zebley constitutes good cause. However,
SSA proved adamant on this point and all but said that even if forced
to withdraw the severity step from the Interim Final Rules, the Secre-
tary would have such a step in the final rules, regardless of public oppo-
sition. Faced with this obstacle to compromise, plaintiffs' counsel
agreed to waive any APA procedural claim for class members227 in
222. 482 U.S. 137 (1987); see n.58, supra.
223. Justice O'Connor's crucial concurrence in Yuckert acknowledged the evi-
dence of abuse but relied upon SSA's representations that the apparent abuse in the
implementation of the severity step ceased. 482 U.S. at 157. Indeed, the number of
cases denied at this step has dropped precipitously in the aftermath of Yuckert, but
many advocates fear a recurrence. See n.58, supra.
224. 5 U.S.C. § 551. Although agencies administering grant programs are ex-
empt from the APA, HHS, like almost all federal departments, has agreed to be bound
by the APA. 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971).
225. See e.g., Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1983); Nat'l Ass'n of
Farmworkers Org. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (invocation of good
cause appropriate only in the rare case of compelling necessity).
226. 56 Fed. Reg. 5538, 5552.
227. Stipulation and Order $ II. A child denied for the first time after May 3,
1990 would not be a class member and therefore would not be bound by the waiver.
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return for a program of careful monitoring of implementation of the
severity step.
228
Another, more positive major change in the evaluation process for
children is the expansion of the equivalence step to include a functional
evaluation of equivalence for the first time. 29 This had been explicitly
forbidden in SSA policy,2 30 preventing a flexible determination at step
three. SSA will now allow a comparison of any condition to the func-
tional effects of any listing, which should prove very favorable to claim-
ants, especially given the much-improved mental impairment listings.
Although SSA intends to restrict this liberalization by keeping the
equivalence determination within the province of its doctors, the trend
in the caselaw suggests that treating physician opinion on equivalence
will be afforded great weight. 2 1 At the very least, this functional equiv-
alence policy will allow for a mechanism for the agency to correct out-
of-date listings and to make better adjudications of unlisted impair-
ments. Moreover, the list of examples of functionally equivalent condi-
tions23 2 should give some guidance to physicians who wish to analogize
functional limitations and screen out conditions that are obviously
disabling.
Despite incorporation of a new IFA step that implements the Su-
preme Court's decision, 38 there remain some notable deficiencies. The
too-young-to-test phenomenon that drew such attention from the Su-
preme Court has been reduced to a policy that only protects children 0-
1234 by allowing adjudicators to award benefits based on a reasonable
expectation that the impairment will substantially reduce ability to
function. This will undoubtedly be the subject of continuing contro-
versy in the final rulemaking and in litigation. Advocates will undoubt-
edly press for a policy that allows children to be assessed by state of
the art diagnostic techniques, including ones that give the treating phy-
sician adequate information to provide treatment.
Counsel reasoned that without evidence of abuse it would be particularly difficult to
convince a court of irreparable harm in light of the Yuckert case.
228. Stipulation and Order I VIII.
229. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(3).
230. Most notably in SSR 83-19.
231. Advocates will have to play a role here in obtaining such opinions since
SSA refuses to elicit them or even share the listings with treating physicians when they
are asked for their opinions. This practice will continue the decisional disparity between
the application and reconsideration steps and the ALJ step, where allowance rates are
considerably higher.
232. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). For example, all premature infants weighing less
than 1200 grams (about 2.6 pounds) will be found disabled, as will those infants weigh-
ing 1200-2000 grams (about 4.4 pounds) who are at least 4 weeks small for gestational
age. This should be a tremendous help to children and their families.
233. The heart of the IFA step is embodied in § 416.924a and in §§ 416.924c,
.924d and .924e.
234. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a).
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Especially since younger children are difficult to test by adult and
adolescent standards, SSA will be hard-pressed to defend a policy that
only recognizes the difficulties of diagnosing the youngest infants and
does not recognize the availability of alternative diagnostic techniques
for young children. Moreover, informed clinical judgment must be
sought and recognized as an alternative for untestable children. For
example, if a pediatrician can reliably predict that a condition will re-
sult in inability to walk, that child should be considered disabled, even
if she is currently too young to be expected to walk. This result should
pertain regardless of age - there is no reason to allow such an opinion
to control at age 11 months but not at 13 months. The ultimate crite-
rion should be a flexible one based on accepted medical practice in
keeping with the Supreme Court's decision286
Another controversial area will likely be SSA's use of domains and
developmental norms as the primary means of evaluating disability.
The controversy arises from the use in an unfamiliar context of medical
terms that have set meanings and applications. The agency maintains
that it defines these domains as all-inclusive, and that non-developmen-
tal impairments can be analyzed by the secondary effects of these im-
pairments by evaluating them in developmental terms. 3 6 Thus, a child
who is born without fingers would be considered to have a loss of motor
function that would lead to a finding of disability. Similarly, a child
who suffers from rectal incontinence would be evaluated in terms of his
inability to perform activities of daily living, even though his inability
stems not from his physical or mental inability to perform the physical
and intellectual tasks but from his inability to function in the greater
world in which these tasks and activities are performed, because his
incontinence prevents him from going out.
The problem with this formulation is not that it is illogical, but
that it is left unarticulated in the regulations and that it fails to recog-
nize that these developmental norms and domains have accepted mean-
ings in the medical community and that they are not used to assess and
describe non-developmental impairments. Thus, an orthopedist will not
likely refer in treatment notes or a report to the fine motor skill deficits
of a child who does not have any fingers; such a deficit would be obvi-
ous to the practitioner. Without such assessments the adjudicator will
be forced to make such an analysis without the assistance of medical
235. See 110 S. Ct. 894 n.17.
236. Letter of April 24, 1991 from A. George Lowe, SSA, Office of General
Counsel to Zebley class counsel:
[P]hysical impairments are adequately covered by the various domains
of functioning and the various "behaviors" because the system is a method
of categorizing all functional effects of impairments; that is, by definition all
effects of physical and mental impairments are to be included in the system
devised by SSA in the new rules.
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opinion. Although such an analysis might not be difficult in the exam-
ples of children without fingers or rectal incontinence, one can imagine
much more difficult cases in which the regulation's expectation of a
developmental analysis and the medical evidence's lack of such analysis
will lead to poor decision-making or, at the very least, much more diffi-
cult and time-consuming decision-making, as additional evidence from
parents, teachers, and others is solicited and analyzed. 8 This situation
is further complicated by SSA's failure to explain its underlying pre-
mise of definitional all-inclusiveness238 and its redefinition of medical
terms of art. Such confusion and implicit assumptions will undoubtedly
lead to a certain amount of arbitrary decision-making for those with
non-developmental impairments.
The recitation of these shortcomings should not, however, obscure
the tremendous changes that these regulations will work. There can be
no doubt that many more seriously impaired children will be awarded
benefits under the new regulations. These-new regulations clearly and
explicitly go beyond the listings, awarding benefits to children whose
impairments do not rise to the level of the listings and providing a
framework for the analysis of all cases in functional terms, including
those who have unlisted impairments, combinations of impairments or
diagnoses based on the current state of the art.
D. Medicaid Corrective Payments
Individuals eligible for SSI are generally eligible for medical assis-
tance (Medicaid) under Title XIX of the Social Security Act.23 9 Al-
though a few states have exercised an option not to extend Medicaid to
SSI recipients, or only to some of them,4 the vast majority of states
237. Already SSA is concerned that it will be very difficult to gather evidence
from schools during the summer, especially in smaller districts where the bureaucracy
virtually ceases to function and teachers are on vacation. Obtaining evidence from par-
ents, although essential, will not be easy, given cultural and language problems as well
as the lack of education and the lack of any basis to compare to normal development.
Further, the authors have observed that SSA adjudicators view parental descriptions of
function as unreliable, often ascribing pecuniary motives to the parent.
238. By "definitional all-inclusiveness," the authors mean the SSA position ar-
ticulated in footnote 236, supra.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(II) (1988); 42 C.F.R. §435.210 (1990).
240. Rather than covering all SSI recipients, some states have exercised an op-
tion in the Medicaid statute allowing them to apply eligibility standards that are more
restrictive than SSI but no more restrictive than the Medicaid eligibility rules that
were in effect in the state on January 1, 1972. 42 U.S&C. § 1396a(f) (1988); 42 C.F.R.
§ 435.121 (1990). The states that have chosen the more restrictive eligibility option are
often referred to as "209(b) states," after the section of the 1972 Social Security Act
amendments that created the option. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-
603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972). These states may be more restrictive than SSI in defining
blindness, or disability, or in establishing income or resource requirements in terms of
granting Medicaid eligibility provided that the condition enforced was used in 1972.
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automatically grant coverage."' Indeed, thirty-one of the states con-
sider an application for SSI to be an application for Medicaid. 2 Thus,
in these thirty-one states, children denied SSI benefits under the old,
illegal standard were also denied Medicaid. 43 Now, however, after the
readjudication of their original SSI application, many class members
will qualify for benefits, including Medicaid. The question then be-
comes how Will Medicaid benefits be restored to those found eligible,
often many years after their original application." Plaintiffs, noting
the logistical problems presented by extending benefits for such a long
period, requested that the defendant Secretary, who is also charged
with the supervision of the program, 245 order states to establish a mech-
anism for the presentation of medical bills for services rendered during
the period covered by the class action. Such a mechanism 46 is neces-
sary to insure the orderly restoration of benefits, which indeed is re-
quired by HHS regulations under the rubric of corrective payments. 47
An orderly mechanism for making corrective payments would be
of great value to class members. Many disabled children have enor-
mous medical bills that will otherwise go uncovered unless they qualify
for Medicaid. Given the relatively liberal income counting rules of the
SSI program 248 and the relatively high payment levels of the SSI pro-
gram, 249 the only way for many children to secure health coverage is
through the SSI program.
The Secretary, however, resisted such an order, countering that
the most he could do was request states to make corrective payments if
The more restrictive requirements may apply to the aged, blind, or disabled, or any
combination.
241. In 41 states all disabled children qualifying for SSI are eligible for Medi-
caid. H. Fox & A. Greaney, supra note 4, at 27.
242. DHHS, HCFA, Analysis of State Medicaid Program Characteristics, Table
59, p. 107 (1987). This arrangement is authorized by § 1634 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383c (1988). Another 10 states, although granting Medicaid eligibility to SSI recip-
ients, require a separate application with the state Medicaid agency. Id.
243. Some of the children may have been otherwise eligible for Medicaid.
244. Medicaid benefits generally begin with application, although states must
also consider eligibility during a retroactive period from the third month before the
application is received. 42 C.F.R. § 435.914 (1990).
245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 1396a(a)(4) (1988).
246. Massachusetts and New York are among the few states that currently have
a fully operational procedure, MASS. REGs. CODE tit. 166, § 507.130 (1990); Transmit-
ted Nos. 87 ADM-48 (Dec. 10, 1987); 88 ADM-31 (July 15, 1988), although all states
theoretically will make corrective payments on an ad hoc basis.
247. 42 C.F.R. § 431.246 (1990).
248. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1201-.1266 (1990).
249. Although SSI benefits are below the federal poverty level, 56 Fed. Reg.
6859 (1991), they are still far above the amount paid in virtually all states under the
AFDC program, eligibility for which automatically entitles a child to Medicaid. 42
C.F.R. §435.110 (1990). Many children are in this gap between AFDC and SSI, too
well off for AFDC but unable to pay for medical care.
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they wished to do so. 25 0 The Secretary argued that he was without
power under the Medicaid program to tell participating states what to
do and that such a direction would violate the eleventh amendment.
Both arguments appear flawed.
The Secretary has broad powers in the Medicaid program to adopt
rules and regulations for the proper and efficient conduct of the pro-
gram 2 1 and to ensure that the program is run in the best interests of
recipients. Not only has he ordered such payments in the past, both
in the context of litigation53 and voluntarily,25 but his own regulations
require such payments to be made in all cases.25 5 However, he coun-
tered that denials prior to the Supreme Court's decision were not "in-
correct" when made, because they were authorized by the Secretary's
regulation.
As to the eleventh amendment, it applies only to the federal
courts' judicial powers and not to the relationship between the states
and the executive branch, which frequently operate joint federal-state
social welfare programs where participating states make payments
under the federally promulgated rules. Since the plaintiffs sought only
to require the Secretary to exercise his authority under the Act, rather
than to seek a money judgment against the states, the immunity
granted the states under the eleventh amendment, as articulated in so-
cial welfare cases such as Edelman v. Jordan2 56 and more recently in
Green v. Mansour25 7 and Quern v. Jordan 58 should not be threatened.
Of course, should a state fail to follow the Secretary's direction to
make corrective payments, the only means of redress would be through
the Secretary's enforcement power 25 1 rather than through the courts.
250. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Proposed Remedial Order,
Zebley v. Sullivan, No. 83-3314 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1990).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(4) (1988).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1988).
253. Lynch v. Rank, 747 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1984), amended on reh'g, 763 F.2d
1098 (9th Cir. 1985).
254. See Department of Health and Human Services Program Memorandum
Medicaid State Agencies 90-1 (Jan. 1990).
255. 42 C.F.R. § 431.246 (1990).
256. 415 U.S. 651 (1974), reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974) (holding that the
eleventh amendment bars retroactive payment of welfare benefits found to have been
wrongfully withheld).
257. 474 U.S. 68 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986) (holding that elev-
enth amendment and principles governing issuance of declaratory judgments forbade
either "notice relief" or declaration that prior conduct violated federal law).
258. 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 does not
abrogate the eleventh amendment immunity of the states but the eleventh amendment
does not prohibit the district court from ordering state officials to inform plaintiff class
members that there were existing administrative procedures by which they could re-
ceive a determination of eligibility for past welfare benefits).
259. The Secretary has broad powers to prescribe state action as necessary for
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The difficulty, as far as the eleventh amendment goes, is in having a
federal court force a state to make payments by a two-step process of
ordering the Secretary to force the states to make payments.
Eventually, an agreement was reached whereby the Secretary
would "encourage" states to make retroactive payments for the period
prior to the Court's decision and require payments for the period after
the Court's decision. 260 Plaintiffs decided to drop their insistence on ret-
roactive payments because the original complaint had not sought Medi-
caid relief, thus weakening their position and, at the same time, al-
lowing advocates in the states to press for corrective payments without
fear of being barred by resjudicata.
E. Class Relief
Perhaps the greatest issue to be resolved after the Supreme
Court's decision was the question of who was a class member and
therefore entitled to relief. Although the district court had, prior to its
ultimate decision denying relief, certified the class, the description of
the class was somewhat ambiguous, at least as to the crucial point of
how far back the class should reach. On the one hand, SSA had main-
tained throughout the litigation that it had used the same standard
since the SSI program's inception in 1974. Extending relief to all chil-
dren denied benefits since 1974 would afford potential relief to as many
as one million children.261 On the other hand, restricting the class to
those denied benefits after the suit was filed in 1983 would limit relief
to approximately 280,000 children. 62
The Secretary argued for the latter date, basing his position on
several cases holding that the sixty-day appeal period found in 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) barred claims denied more than sixty days prior to the
filing of the lawsuit. 63 Class counsel acknowledged that claims denied
more than sixty days prior to the filing of the complaint were normally
barred, but asserted that the limitation could be equitably tolled under
the standard articulated in Bowen v. City of New York. 64
Bowen v. City of New York involved a class challenge to a sub-
the proper and efficient administration of the program, and may withhold some or all
federal funds in order to bring a state in compliance. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(4) (1988);
42 C.F.R. §430.35 (1990).
260. Stipulation and Order, t XII (March 18, 1991).
261. SSA, Estimated Number of Children's Disability Denials by Year (un-
dated) (on file with authors).
262. See Declaration of Jean Hall Hinckley at 1, Zebley v. Sullivan, No. 83-
3314 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 1990).
263. Such a formulation would have limited the class to claims denied on or after
May 13, 1983 according to the Secretary, although this calculation ignores the five
days for service by mailing. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1401, 416.1481 (1990).
264. 476 U.S. 467 (1986).
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regulatory policy adopted by SSA. The policy had the effect of denying
disability benefits to younger adults (ages 18-45) who were mentally ill,
but did not meet the adult Listings of Impairments. By the time the
case reached the Supreme Court, the Secretary conceded that the pol-
icy employed was illegal. 265 The Court found "[tihe Secretary's secre-
tive conduct justified tolling the period 'during the time that SSA's pol-
icy of applying the challenged presumption concerning residual
functional capacity remained operative but undisclosed.' "266 A unani-
mous Supreme Court affirmed the inclusion in the class of claimants
who failed to bring suit within sixty days of receiving a final decision
from the Secretary.267 The Court held that the sixty-day requirement
constituted a period of limitations that may be waived, subject to tradi-
tional equitable tolling principles. 6 8
The Court noted that waiver should not be construed "unduly re-
strictively," that Congress designed the Act's statute of limitation to be
"unusually protective" of claimants, and that Congress has expressed
"its clear intention to allow tolling in some cases. 2 69 Finally, the Court
concluded that the equities in favor of tolling-were compelling where
claimants "did not and could not know that those adverse decisions had
been made on the basis of a systematic procedural irregularity that
rendered them subject to court challenge. "270
Counsel for the Zebley class argued that the equities in favor of
tolling were similarly compelling. As the Supreme Court noted, the
regulations proposed by the Secretary in 1974:
gave little warning of the Secretary's current, strictly limited equiva-
lence analysis. At least until SSR 83-19 was promulgated in 1983, it
did not become clear that the listings criteria would be applied so
rigidly, and that proof of equivalence would require a strict match-
ing of the criteria for the single most similar listed impairment.27 1
Thus, like the mentally ill claimants in Bowen v. City of New York, the
child claimants of Zebley did not know and could not have known prior
265. Id. at 477-78.
266. Id. (quoting City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 738 (2nd Cir.
1984).
267. Id. at 480-82.
268. Id. at 478-79.
269. Id. at 479-80. In some instances, "the equities in favor of tolling" are so
great that it would be "inappropriate" to defer to the agency. Id. (citation omitted).
270. Id. at 480-81 (quoting Bowen, 742 F.2d at 738).
271. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. at 895 n.19. The question of how "knowable" the Secre-
tary's policy was for evaluating childhood disability was at issue because the Secretary
had argued that his regulations were consistent and longstanding and therefore entitled
to great deference. Further, he argued that his policy was known to Congress, which
implicitly affirmed it when it mandated the publication of childhood listings in § 501(b)
of the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-566, 90 Stat.
2667 (1976).
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to 1983 that the Secretary's regulations were being interpreted in a
manner contrary to congressional intent, rendering adverse decisions
subject to court challenge.
Further, the class of disabled children was extraordinarily similar
to the class in Bowen v. City of New York. First, like the mentally ill,
children are generally protected from the operation of statutes of limi-
tations.2  Second, approximately 60% of SSI children's cases involve
mental illness or retardation .27  Third, the typical SSI child applicant is
not likely to have sophisticated adult resources to fall back upon. Fif-
teen percent of child SSI recipients live in foster homes, their own
homes having been judged inadequate;27' of those who live in their own
home, the overwhelming majority live in single-parent households and
in any event, their parents are likely to have no more than eight or nine
years of schooling2"5
Despite these characteristics, the Secretary argued strongly that
equitable tolling was inappropriate. Citing Pittston Coal Group v. Seb-
ben,27 the Secretary argued that equitable tolling was only appropriate
in cases of affirmative misconduct and clandestine policy. Since his re-
sounding defeat in Bowen v. City of New York, the Secretary has
sought to limit its broad holding and the Court's suggestion that equi-
table tolling is consistent with congressional intent in a variety of cir-
cumstances of which Bowen v. City of New York is but one of the
easier scenarios.2  Sebben, the Secretary argued, is a ringing confirma-
tion of the narrow interpretation of Bowen v. City of New York.
Sebben involved an attack on the Secretary of Labor's regulations
regarding the controversial and often litigated black lung benefits pro-
gram. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit had upheld the attack on the Sec-
retary's regulation and applied the Bowen v. City of New York analy-
sis, concluding that equitable tolling was appropriate. 27 '8 The Supreme
Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit's determination that the regula-
tion was invalid, but reversed the use of mandamus jurisdiction to order
readjudication of final determinations. 79 Having thus decided that
mandamus jurisdiction was inappropriate, the Court went on in dicta to
discuss the applicability of Bowen v. City of New York. Justice Scalia
asserted: "Even assuming that equitable tolling is available under the
272. See, e.g., 51 AM. JUR. 2D, Limitations of Actions, § 182 (1970); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42, § 5533(b) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
273. See Staff Report, supra note 92 (providing summary of disability determi-
nation process, and analysis and data regarding childhood mental impairment cases).
274. SSA, Survey of Blind and Disabled Children Receiving SSI Benefits at ii
(1979).
275. Id. at iv.
276. 488 U.S. 105 (1988).
277. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. at 487.
278. In re Sebben, 815 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1987).
279. Sebben, 488 U.S. at 123.
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. ..Act, the conditions for applying it do not exist. The agency action
here was not taken pursuant to a secret, internal policy, but under a
regulation that was published for all to see."2 80 The Secretary inter-
prets this to mean that Bowen v. City of New York is to be construed
narrowly on its particular facts, and that equitable tolling is appropri-
ate only in cases of intentional deception and secret policy.
Such a reading not only ignores the obvious, that is, that Sebben
was construing a different statute, and that Justice Scalia's assertion is
merely dicta, but also that Bowen v. City of New York used a careful,
fact-based analysis to arrive at its conclusion. 28' That decision clearly
turned on the totality of the facts, rather than on the existence of a
secret policy. In an oft-quoted passage, the Court concluded:
"[W]hatever the outer bounds of our holding today, this case falls well
within them. While 'hard' cases may arise, this is not one of them.
'282
Aside from the dubious applicability of Sebben, the facts in Zebley
are much closer to those in Bowen v. City of New York than in Sebben.
Although the Secretary did promulgate a regulation saying that chil-
dren would be required to meet or equal a listing, it was three years
before childhood listings were promulgated. Even then, it was unclear
until Ruling 83-19 was published in 1983, that children could not use
the "equals" determination to obtain a realistic assessment of their in-
dividual functional capacity. Two courts have already held that the rul-
ings themselves are sufficiently secret to trigger equitable tolling.28 3
Furthermore, in Zebley, the Court observed that even Congress was
unaware of the monster the Secretary had created.2 8' This congres-
sional lack of awareness, coupled with the characteristics of the class,
such as their youth and frequent mental handicaps, made equitable
tolling particularly appropriate.
The stipulation eventually set out the start date for the class at
January 1, 1980, a reflection of the Secretary's lack of confidence in
the validity of SSR 83-19, and especially its effective date three years
earlier than its publication date. 8 5 Plaintiffs also compromised, recog-
nizing the uncertainty of litigation post-Sebben and the difficulty of ar-
280. Id.
281. Indeed, the decision cites traditional equitable tolling cases such as Ameri-
can Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 952
(1974), and Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484 (1967). Bowen v. City of New York, 476
U.S. at 479, 481.
282. Id. at 487.
283. See Dixon v. Bowen, 126 F.R.D. 483, 487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Itlhe Sec-
retary's use of an unpublished SSR [can amount] to secretive conduct."); Hill v. Sulli-
van, 125 F.R.D. 86, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[t]he Secretary's failure to publish the chal-
lenged rulings 'has had the same practical effect on claimants as the defendant's
secretive conduct in City of New York.' ") (citation omitted).
284. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. at 895 n.19.
285. Stipulation and Order I I(B) (March 18, 1991).
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guing for a date much earlier given the explicit nature of the Secre-
tary's regulation.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR DISABLED WIDOWS
In addition to its impact on disabled children, Zebley provided
hope for another group that has been disadvantaged under SSA's poli-
cies - disabled widows. As noted, prior to 1991, the statutory standard
of disability was different for widows than for workers.2 s Indeed, the
Court suggested that SSA violated the Act by treating children compa-
rably to widows rather than to workers:
Under the Secretary's regulations and rulings, both widows and chil-
dren qualify for benefits only if the medical evidence of their impair-
ments meets or equals a listing. Title II provides: "A widow ... or
widower shall not be determined to be under a disability . . . unless
his or her ... impairment or impairments are of a level of severity
which under regulations prescribed by the Secretary is deemed to be
sufficient to preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful ac-
tivity." When Congress set out to provide disabled children with
benefits, it chose to link the disability standard not to this test, but
instead to the more liberal test set forth in § 423(d)(2)(A) and in
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) (any impairment making a claimant "unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity" qualifies him for bene-
fits). The Secretary's regulations, treating child-disability claims like
claims for widows' benefits, nullify this congressional choice.1
87
Nevertheless, Zebley can hardly be interpreted as an endorsement
of SSA's listings-only rule for disabled widows. The Court emphasized
the statutory mandate of an inquiry into the functional impact of im-
pairments on the individual:
The statute generally defines "disability" in terms of an individual-
ized, functional inquiry into the effect of medical problems on a per-
son's ability to work. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 (Social Security Act
adopts "functional approach"); Campbell, 461 U.S. at 459-460, 467
(Act "defines 'disability' in terms of the effect a physical or mental
impairment has on a person's ability to function in the workplace";
"statutory scheme contemplates that disability hearings will be indi-
vidualized determinations"). 88
Indeed, three of the four explicit reasons articulated by the Court
for rejecting the listings-only approach to children are applicable to
widows under the law prior to 1991. First, the listings "do not cover all
286. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (1988).
287. Zebley at 895 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
288. Id. at 890. "The statutory standard for child disability is explicitly linked to
this functional, individualized standard . . . ." Id.
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illnesses and abnormalities that actually can be disabling." '289 Second,
the listings "exclude any claimant whose impairment would not prevent
any and all persons" from engaging in any gainful activity "but which
actually precludes the particular claimant" from gainful activity "given
its actual effects on him - such as pain, consequences of medication,
and other symptoms that vary greatly with the individual."290 Third,
"the equivalence analysis excludes claimants who have unlisted impair-
ments, or combinations of impairments, that do not fulfill all the crite-
ria for any one listed impairment." 29'
Litigation challenging the listings-only approach for widows had
been mounting for some time. In 1982, in Smith v. Schweiker 92 the
Third Circuit was presented with a claim that pain be considered a
disabling condition for widows as it is for workers. The Secretary re-
sponded that pain was irrelevant since it was not one of the conditions
included in the listings. 9 The court remanded the case for considera-
tion of the widow's pain as a symptom of medical impairment to be
considered in evaluating equivalence to a listing, without reaching the
ultimate issue. 94
Also in 1982, in Paris v. Schweiker,2 " the Eighth Circuit gave a
broad reading to medical equivalence and awarded benefits to a widow
where she conceded that none of her impairments considered alone met
a listed impairment. The court rejected the Secretary's approach, later
formalized in SSR 83-19, of comparing each isolated condition to a
specific listing. 96
In 1985, in Tolany v. Heckler,297 the Second Circuit expressed
concern with the listings-only standard:
If a claimant has an impairment that is not listed and is not the
medical equivalent of a listed impairment, but the claimant never-
theless is unable to engage in any gainful activity, it is difficult to see
how that person may be denied benefits. It would seem anomalous if
an impairment that is only presumed to be disabling because it is
listed results in allowance of benefits, yet an impairment that in fact
leaves the claimant without the residual functional capacity to en-
gage in any gainful activity is insufficient to warrant benefits.298
289. Id. at 893.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. 671 F.2d 789 (3rd Cir. 1982).
293. Id. at 791-93.
294. Id. at 793-94; see also Roberts v. Califano, 439 F. Supp. 188 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (remanding widow's case for consideration of pain).
295. 674 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1982).
296. Id. at 709-10.
297. 756 F.2d 268 (3rd Cir. 1985).
298. Id. at 271.
[Vol. 35:5391 590
SULLIVAN v. ZEBLEY
However, the court found that this case did not clearly pose the issue of
the role of residual functional capacity in widows' claims and remanded
for consideration of new medical evidence. 99
In 1987, in Willeford v. Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices,300 a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected an attack on the
listings-only approach for widows in a claim by an individual appellant.
However, even the majority opinion, authored by future Justice Ken-
nedy, held out the possibility of a different result in an appropriate
case:
None of this indicates that Mrs. Willeford's position lacks substance.
There is merit to her suggestion that the ability to engage in gainful
activity is the "core" of the medical equivalence test. And it is dis-
tinctly possible that there will be cases where the absence of that
ability is demonstrated in such a compelling fashion that the listing
becomes a mechanical and unrealistic bar to a just determination. 301
Finally, in 1988, the district court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois, in Marcus v. Bowen,30 2 a class action, flatly rejected the Secre-
tary's failure to perform an assessment of residual functional capacity
of widows who do not meet or equal a listing:
While Congress intended adjudication of spousal disability claims to
be governed by a tougher standard - any gainful employment as
opposed to substantial gainful employment - and did not allow
consideration of the individual's vocational factors, it cannot be con-
cluded that Congress intended benefits to be denied without an adju-
dicatory inquiry into the extent of impairment. Where functional
analysis is required, either to determine the severity level of a single
impairment or to measure the combined impact of multiple impair-
ments, the Secretary's denial of benefits under current practice must
fail.303
Then, in October 1989, the Second Circuit directly addressed the
issue left open in Tolany. In Kier v. Sullivan,304 the court recognized
that the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience are
inapplicable to widows' claims.300 Nevertheless, the court found that
SSA violated the statute by ignoring widows' residual functional
capacity:
In Tolany, we deemed it inappropriate to decide whether a
299. Id. at 272.
300. 824 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1987).
301. Id. at 774 (citation omitted).
302. 696 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Il. 1988), affd sub nom. Marcus v. Sullivan, 926
F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1991).
303. Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
304. 888 F.2d 244 (2nd Cir. 1989).
305. Id. at 246.
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claimant who does not have the residual functional capacity to en-
gage in any gainful activity is medically equivalent to a claimant
with a listed impairment. Instead, we asked the Secretary to eluci-
date "what role residual functional capacity plays in determining a
widow's claim." The Secretary's position, conveyed in continued reli-
ance on Social Security Ruling 83-19, appears to be no role at all,
since that ruling forbids adjudicators from considering a widow's
residual functional capacity in determining medical equivalence.
This ruling conflicts with the language of the statute.80
Shortly thereafter, the First Circuit followed suit in Cassas v. Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services. °7 The court directed the Secre-
tary to assess the residual functional capacity of widows in determining
medical equivalence:
The challenge in the present case is narrower and more pre-
cisely targeted. It does not necessarily attack the facial validity of
the regulatory requirement that a claimant must have a listed im-
pairment or one medically equivalent thereto before being eligible
for benefits, but rather, implicates the manner in which medical
equivalence is to be determined, a matter not addressed in Hinckley.
We need go no further. Although we reject appellant's conten-
tion that the Secretary was required, on this record, to find that her
condition was the same in August 1987 as it was 14 /2 months ear-
lier, we agree with the Second Circuit that residual functional ca-
pacity cannot be ignored in considering medical equivalence and, ul-
timately, disability.""
Interestingly, the First Circuit denied rehearing in April 1990, af-
ter Zebley was decided, without reference to the Supreme Court's opin-
ion.3 09 The court emphasized that in mandating a residual functional
capacity assessment, it was not ordering consideration of a widow's age,
education, or work history.310
In the first reported decision applying Zebley to a widow's claim,
the district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the
denial of benefits to widows whose impairments do not meet or equal a
listing, but who lack the residual functional capacity for any gainful
activity. In Robinson v. Sullivan, 18 the court refused to read Zebley as
validating the Secretary's approach to widows' cases:
I reject the Secretary's argument. The Zebley Court's discus-
306. Id. at 247 (citation omitted).
307. 893 F.2d 454 (1st Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S.
App. file).
308. Id. at 458 (emphasis in original).
309. Id. at 458-59.
310. Id.
311. 733 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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sion of the distinction between children's benefits and widows' bene-
fits serves only to support the Court's conclusion that the regulations
concerning child disability are invalid. In so doing, the Zebley Court
merely affirmed that which the claimant in this case does not dis-
pute, that the statutory standard for widows' benefits is stricter than
the wage-earners' standard. The fact that widows are held to a
higher statutory standard does not permit the Secretary to deny ben-
efits to claimants who meet the statutory requirements but who do
not qualify under the regulations."'
Rather, the court applied Zebley's rationale to overturn the listings-
only assessment of widows:
The Zebley Court held that the Secretary's regulations were in-
valid in part because a child with unlisted impairments or with a
combination of impairments that are not equivalent to any one list-
ing would be denied benefits even if the disability prevents the child
from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. In this case the
Secretary's regulations governing widows' benefits are invalid under
an analogous rationale. Under the regulations, a widow with unlisted
impairments or a combinations of impairments which render her un-
able to engage in any gainful activity but which are not equivalent to
any one listing would be denied benefits. A denial of benefits in such
a case is inconsistent with the language of the statute."'
The court mandated an individualized assessment of widows' residual
functional capacities to perform any gainful activity:
I conclude that under § 423(d)(2)(B) the Secretary must pro-
vide widows' disability claimants with an individualized opportunity
to demonstrate inability to engage in any gainful activity. The Secre-
tary's regulations are invalid only insofar as they do not permit such
a determination. On remand, the Secretary must afford the claimant
such an opportunity for an individualized assessment of her RFC. If
the claimant is unable to engage in any gainful activity, she must be
awarded benefits.3
In July 1990, the Ninth Circuit became the first appellate court to
apply the Zebley rationale to widows, In Ruff v. Sullivan,315 the court
referred to Zebley's reasoning that. "listings obviously do not cover all
illnesses and abnormalities that actually can be disabling. ' '3 16 Following
312. Id. at 995 (citation omitted).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 997 (footnotes omitted). The court noted that the Third Circuit had
reserved judgment on this issue in Finkeistein v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 215 (3rd Cir. 1989),
cert. granted sub nom. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 110 S. Ct. 862 (1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 110 S. Ct. 2658 (1990). Id. at 897 n.18, on remand 924 F.2d 483 (3rd Cir.
1991).
315. 907 F.2d 915 (1990).
316. Id. at 919 (emphasis added) (quoting Zebley, 110 S. Ct. at 893).
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Kier and Cassas, the court concluded: "We hold that residual func-
tional capacity must be considered in determining whether a disabling
physical or mental condition is the medical equivalent of a listed
impairment.
3 17
After its defeats in Kier, Cassas, and Ruff, SSA issued "Acquies-
cence Rulings" implying that it would not automatically deny benefits
to claimants in those circuits whose impairments do not meet or equal
a listing. 18 However, these initial "Acquiescence Rulings" were grudg-
ing at best, and SSA continued to defend its listings-only approach to
widows' claims in other circuits.
Shortly after Ruff, two more appellate courts utilized the Zebley
rationale to rule that SSA could not deny benefits to widows solely
because they do not have an impairment or impairments that meet or
equal a listing. 19 The day after the second decision, Congress finally
ended the discriminatory treatment of disabled widows. The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA-90) prospectively elimi-
nated the separate standard of disability in the widows' program,
thereby making the adult standard applicable. 2 However, this impor-
tant reform does not end the current litigation for pending claims. The
new standard is only applicable "with respect to monthly insurance
benefits for months after December 1990 for which applications are
filed on or after January 1, 1991, or are pending on such date."1
3 2
1
Therefore, OBRA-90 does not assist claimants for widows' benefits
seeking benefits for months prior to January 1991.1"
VIII. CONCLUSION
The impetus and rationale of Zebley have continued to bear fruit
for claimants seeking widows' benefits in their ongoing litigation.
Utilizing Zebley, the Third323 and Seventh324 Circuits have also man-
dated an assessment of functional limitations in widows' cases. In the
face of acknowledged defeats in seven circuits, SSA has finally issued a
new Ruling, 91-3p, "to provide a uniform national interpretation of the
317. Id.
318. Social Security Acquiescence Rulings 90-6(1), 55 Fed. Reg. 38,398; Social
Security Acquiescence Ruling 90-50(2), 55 Fed. Reg. 38,400; Social Security Acquies-
cence Ruling 90-7(9), 55 Fed Reg. 38,402.
319. Davidson v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 912 F.2d 1246 (10th
Cir. 1990); Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1990).
320. OBRA-90, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-251-254 (1990).
321. Id.
322. Because SSDI benefits can be paid retroactively twelve months prior to ap-
plication, and because onset of disability within seven years of widowhood may be an
issue for claimants, the pre-1991 widows standard will remain important for some time
to come.
323. Finkelstein v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1991).
324. Marcus v. Sullivan, note 302, supra.
[Vol. 35:539
SULLIVAN v. ZEBLEY
regulations for determining entitlement to widows' benefits for months
prior to January 1991. 3 15 Not only is the new ruling nationwide in
scope and accompanied by rescissions of the prior "Acquiescence Rul-
ings",'" but it is far more generous than those prior rulings.
Ruling 91-3p first mandates use of residual functional capacity as-
sessments of widows "in a manner similar to the manner in which
residual functional capacity assessments are used in determining
whether other adult claimants ... are disabled. ' 327 It then directs that
the "five-step sequential evaluation process .. be applied when adjudi-
cating a widow's claim for disability benefits."328 At step five, if the
claimant's residual functional capacity - without considering age, ed-
ucation, and work experience - shows an inability to perform the full
range of sedentary work, the widow will be found disabled.
3
1
9
At this writing, it appears that the strategy adopted in the Zebley
litigation has been more successful than could possibly have been
imagined when suit was filed almost a decade ago. Not only was it
unnecessary to sacrifice widows' claims, but disabled widows have
benefitted enormously. Perhaps inspired by Zebley itself, and certainly
inspired by the widows' cases relying on Zebley, Congress has now
mandated equal treatment for disabled widows as of this year. Perhaps
inspired by Zebley or fearful of a similar defeat in the Supreme Court
in a widow's case, SSA has finally adopted a realistic functional assess-
ment for prior widows' claims.
After failing to implement the "comparable severity" standard for
children for some seventeen years, SSA is finally using, for the time
being at least, a realistic evaluation of children with disabilities. Initial
reversal rates show vast improvement in terms of the percentage of
such children being granted their essential SSI benefits.3
In defending Zebley in the Supreme Court, SSA claimed that it
was already implementing the "comparable severity" standard. Now
that the Supreme Court has compelled SSA actually to do so, we can
foresee more remarkable results of the Zebley litigation. By SSA's own
estimates, it will pay out an additional $2,286,000,000 to
$3,147,000,000 in SSI and Medicaid benefits to, or on behalf of, dis-
abled children over the next five years. 31 State supplements and the
325. Social Security Ruling SSR 91-3p, 56 Fed. Reg. 23,589, 23,590 (1991).
326. 56 Fed. Reg. 23,591-23,593 (1991).
327. SSR 91-3p, supra note 325 at 23,590.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 23,591.
330. SSA, Initial Claims, supra note 168, awarding SSI under Interim Standard
to 59% of cases; initial claims, SSI childhood disability determinations from EIS start
date through 05/10/91 (64% allowance rate under interim final regulation). Many of
these children had been turned down under the pre-Zebley standards.
331. 56 Fed. Reg. 5550 (Feb. 11, 1991).
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states' share of Medicaid will add an additional $623,000,000 to
$863,000,000 over the same period.332 The difference between what
SSA argued it was already dong, and what it now must do, to obey and
implement the law on children's SSI is, indeed, stunning.
332. Id. at 5553.
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